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China has experienced a surge in medical disputes in recent years, on the streets and in
the courts. Many disputes result in violence. Quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence of
medical malpractice litigation and medical disputes in China reveals a dynamic in which the
formal legal system operates in the shadow of protest and violence. The threat of violence leads
hospitals to settle claims for more than would be available in court and also influences how
judges handle cases that do wind up in court. The detailed evidence regarding medical disputes
presented in this article adds depth to existing understanding of institutional development in
China, showing that increased innovation and competence are not resulting in greater authority
for the courts. Despite thirty-four years of legal reforms and significant strengthening of legal
institutions, the shadow of the law remains weak. Medical cases highlight largely unobserved
trends in both law and governance in China, in particular state over-responsiveness to
individual grievances. The findings presented here suggest limitations to contemporary
understanding of both the functioning of the Chinese state and of the role of law in China, and
add to existing literature on the non-convergence of the Chinese system to existing models of
legal and political development.

1

Robert L. Lieff Professor of Law and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. I am
grateful to the outstanding team of research assistants who worked on this project and to the many people in China
who graciously shared their time and insights with me. I am also grateful to the many people who provided helpful
comments on drafts of this article.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2118612

Liebman – Medical Dispute Resolution in China

MALPRACTICE MOBS: MEDICAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA
I. INTRODUCTION
Media accounts report a surge in medical disputes in China in recent years, on the streets
and in the courts. Many disputes result in violence. In January 2011, family members of a
deceased patient stabbed ten doctors in Shanghai, allegedly after a hospital denied treatment
because the family could not pay the cost.2 In August 2011, newspaper accounts around the
world described a brawl at Nanchang No. 1 Hospital, in Jiangxi Province, in which thirty friends
and relatives of a deceased patient clashed with scores of hospital staff, leaving fifteen injured.3
The incident was notable because of the decision by hospital staff to fight back, a sign of
growing frustration about increasingly violent conflicts with patients and their families.
Available official data paint a grim picture. China’s Ministry of Health reported 9831
“grave incidents” of medical disputes in 2006, with 5519 medical staff injured and property
damage of 200 million yuan.4 The total number of medical disputes doubled between 2006 and
2008, to more than a million per year, with each medical institution in China on average
2

Li Mao, Shanghai Moves to Fix Medical Disputes, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/672328/Shanghai-moves-to-fix-medical-disputes.aspx (last visited
July 12, 2012); Shengkun Sun & Wei Wang, Violence against Chinese Health-care Workers, 377 LANCET 9779,
1747 (May 21, 2011), available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736%2811%2960733-2/fulltext#bib1 (last visited July 12, 2012).

南昌通报第一医院医患纠纷斗殴事
大江网

3

Zhao Wanlu, Nanchang Tongbao Diyi Yiyuan Yihuan Jiufen Dou’ou Shijian (
) [Nanchang Reports Hospital-Patient Dispute and Brawl at No.1 Hospital], DAJIANG WANG (
) [Dajiang
Online] (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.jxnews.com.cn/xxrb/system/2011/08/25/011755422.shtml (last visited July 12,
2012); Barbara Demick, Hospital in China Fends Off Angry Mob, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/25/world/la-fg-china-hospital-20110825 (last visited July 12, 2012).

件

4

One U.S. dollar equaled roughly 7.8 yuan in 2006. At present the exchange rate is roughly 6.3 yuan to one U.S.
dollar.
The volume of injuries and incidents was roughly double that reported four years earlier; the property
damage figure represented a tripling from 2002. Zeng Liming, Zhongguo Qunian Fasheng Jin Wanqi Raoluan
Yiliao Zhixu Shijian (
) [China Had Almost Ten Thousand
Incidents Last Year Disturbing Orderly Medical Services and Leaving Five Thousand Injured], ZHONGGUO XINWEN
SHE (
) [China News Agency] (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
http://news.163.com/07/0418/20/3ccuj72d000120gu.html (last visited Nov.15, 2011). The Ministry does not appear
to have made public similar data for subsequent years.

中国去年发生近万起扰乱医疗秩序事件伤五千人

中国新闻社

2
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confronting forty disputes.5 A report on an official website described medical disputes as
“bloody conflicts concerning the accumulation of power in society” and stated that disputes
increased by seventy percent at 350 surveyed hospitals over three years.6 Violent protest has
become common in both rural and urban hospitals.7 In interviews, hospital officials, doctors,
judges, health department officials, and lawyers all report that conflicts relating to medical care
have become increasingly common and more difficult to resolve in the past decade.8
The volume of disputes has also increased in the courts. The Supreme People’s Court
(SPC) reported that courts nationwide heard nearly seventeen thousand medical malpractice
claims in 2010, an increase of 7.6 percent over 2009.9 Statistics from prior years are not
available, but judges and commentators have noted a surge in medical disputes in the courts over
the past decade and have repeatedly cited medical disputes as troublesome for Chinese courts.
5

Id.

6

Li Qiumeng, Zhengxie Weiyuan: Ying Jiada Daji Yinao Weihu Shehui Wending (
) [CPPCC Member: Hospital Protests Ought to be Cracked Down on with Greater Force to Maintain

护社会稳定

政协委员：应加大打击医闹维

东方网

Social Stability], EASTDAY (
) (Mar. 12, 2011), http://news.sohu.com/20110312/n279782428.shtml (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011). Local authorities likewise report a significant increase in the volume of medical disputes,
including violent conflict, and in hospital payouts in recent years. Tang Lei & Liu Gang, Fujian Nanping Cheng
Yinao Shifandi (
) [Nanping of Fujian Province Becomes Model City of Hospital Protests],

福建南平成医闹示范地
ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE (中国新闻社) [China News Agency] (Jul. 7, 2009), http://www.chinanews.com.cn/jk/jk-

hyxw/news/2009/07-07/1764262.shtml (last visited July 12, 2012). A series of studies of hospitals found
that more than seventy percent of medical disputes resulted in disruptive behavior and that more than forty percent
of disputes involved violence. Xu Xin & Lu Rongrong, Baoli Yu Bu Xinren—Zhuanxing Zhongguo De Yiliao Baoli
Yanjiu: 2002-2006 (
—
: 2002-2006) [Violence and Mistrust – A Study on
Medical Violence in a Transforming China: 2002-2006], 2008 FAZHI YU SHEHUI FAZHAN (
) [Legal
System & Social Development] 1, 82 (2008), available at
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=6776 (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).

暴力与不信任 转型中国的医疗暴力研究

法制与社会发展

人大代表称有的医闹带黑势力性质
南京晨报

7

Wang Leyang, Renda Daibiao Cheng Youde Yinao Dai Heishili Xingzhi (
)
[NPC Member Claims that Some Hospital Protests Involve Black Forces], NANJING CHENBAO (
) [Nanjing
Morning News], available at http://health.sohu.com/20070315/n248736421.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2011);
Wenzhi Cai et al., Antecedents of Medical Workplace Violence in South China, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
312, 313 (2011); Danghui Yu & Tiantian Li, Facing Up to the Threat in China, 276 LANCET 1823 (2010).

8

Interview 2009-102; see also Interview 2009-120 (judge describing increased volume of petitions and protests
concerning medical disputes); infra (citing interviews).

9

Unpublished Supreme People’s Court Statistics, on file with author.
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This article presents empirical evidence of medical malpractice litigation and medical
disputes in China in order to develop a broader understanding of trends in institutional
development, dispute resolution, and governance. My focus is in part on national trends and in
part on one mid-sized municipality, which I refer to as Municipality A, in central China.10 This
article is based on interviews with more than fifty doctors, hospital officials, health department
officials, judges and lawyers in Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, and Municipality A, and a review of
152 decisions in lawsuits against hospitals or other medical providers in Municipality A from
2000 to 2009.11 Medical malpractice law has generated extensive academic discussion in China,
in particular in the run-up to the enactment of China’s Tort Liability Law in 2009.12 No prior
literature of which I am aware, in English or Chinese, has engaged in detailed empirical study of
medical litigation in China’s courts or of hospital-patient conflicts more generally.13
10

A municipality is the primary sub-provincial authority in China. Municipalities such as Municipality A generally
have under their jurisdiction both a core urban center and a wide rural area, including in Municipality A’s case five
counties, each with a county town. Municipality A had a population of nearly four million people as of 2009, with
350,000 in the urban center of the municipal seat. Municipality A is home to approximately 100 hospitals including
two hospitals classified as “level three” hospitals, the highest level in China, seventy-one township-level hospitals,
and five privately-run hospitals. Interview 2010-16.

11

All of the decisions are public documents. As is frequently the case in China, however, the fact that decisions are
public does not mean they are readily available. The decisions were collected by judges at the Municipality A
intermediate court from their own court and from each lower court under their jurisdiction. The court shared these
public decisions with a Chinese colleague and me with the request that the court not be identified in this article.
Likewise all of my interviews were conducted on the condition that interviewees would not be identified by name or
institutional affiliation.
12

See, e.g., Chao Xi & Lixin Yang, Medical Liability Laws in China: The Tale of Two Regimes, 19 TORT L. REV. 65
(2011); Wang Liming, Zeren Qinquan Fa De Hexin Shi Baozhang Siquan (
) [The
Core of the Tort Law is to Protect Private Rights], GUANGMING WANG (
) [Guangming Daily Online] (Nov.
12, 2009), http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2009-11/12/content_1007147.htm (last visited July 12, 2012); Yang Lixin,
“Qinquan Zeren Fa” Yiliao Sunhai Zeren Gaige De Chenggong Yu Buzu (“
”
) [Success and Shortcomings of the Medical Malpractice Liability System Reform Through the “Tort
Liability Law”], 4 ZHONGGUO RENMIN DAXUE XUEBAO (
) [Journal of Renmin University of
China] (2010).

成功与不足

侵权责任法的核心是保障私权
光明网
侵权责任法 改革医疗损害责任制度的
中国人民大学学报

13

Prior articles in English discussing medical malpractice law in China have focused almost entirely on the written
law. Dean M. Ham & Chien-Chang Wu, Medical Malpractice in the People’s Republic of China: The 2002
Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 456, 456 (2005); Xi & Yang, supra note
12; Zhu Wang & Ken Oliphant, Yangge Dance: The Rhythm of Liability for Medical Malpractice in the People’s
Republic of China, 87 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 21 (2012). One prior work in Chinese has examined the use of
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Comparative scholarship on medical malpractice law likewise largely focuses on doctrinal
developments, not on empirical study of actual disputes or the institutional dynamics of dispute
resolution.14
Qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence reveals a dynamic in which the formal
legal system operates in the shadow of protest and violence. The threat of protest, often
including violence, leads hospitals to settle claims for more than would be available in court; the
threat also influences courts’ handling of claims that are brought to court. Court decisions do not
provide a framework that influences negotiations outside the court. Instead, stability concerns
shape outcomes in court.
The findings in this article carry implications for three interrelated debates. First, the
evidence presented here adds depth to existing understanding of institutional development in
China. Medical disputes highlight the growing institutional competence of the courts, but they
also show that innovation in the courts does not equate to increased authority. The institutional
development of China’s courts challenges existing assumptions about the development trajectory
of courts in authoritarian systems. Medical cases show how new uses of the courts can serve the
interests of both individuals and the state and may reinforce rather than subvert state authority.
Second, medical disputes show that despite thirty-three years of legal reforms and significant
strengthening of legal institutions, the shadow of law remains weak. Violence and protest are
now part of the cycle of dispute resolution. Routine legal issues are frequently converted into
political issues, and courts lack a privileged position in setting legal norms. Third, medical
violence in medical disputes in China. Xu & Lu, supra note 5. Likewise, one prior English study discussed violence
against medical staff generally. Cai et al., supra note 7.
14

Rare exceptions include work on Japan and Taiwan. See, e.g., Eric Feldman, Law, Culture, and Conflict Dispute
Resolution in Postwar Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50 (Daniel Foote ed., 2007); ERIC FELDMAN, THE
RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY (2000); Jou-juo Chu & Lin Donglong, Yiliao
Gongdao Ruhe Tao? Taiwan Yiliao Jiufen Chuli Jizhi Bibing Zhi Tantao (
) [How to Seek Medical Justice? A Discussion on the Problems in Taiwanese Medical Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms], 11 YISHI FAXUE (
) [J. L. & Med.] 3, 31 (2003); You Zongxian & Yang Xiuyi,

醫療公道如何討？台灣醫療糾紛處理機

制弊病之探討

醫事法學

台灣醫療糾紛自力救濟之實證研究

Taiwan Yiliao Jiufen Zili Jiuji Zhi Shizheng Yanjiu—Jianbao Ziliao Fenxi (
—
) [Case Studies on Self-Help in Medical Disputes in Taiwan—An Analysis Based on Newspaper
Clippings], 14 YISHI FAXUE (
) [J. L. & Med.] 1, 87 (2006).

剪報資料分析

醫事法學
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malpractice cases highlight state over-responsiveness to some individual grievances. Prior
literature has examined the use of cycles of repression and concession as a governance tool in
China. Prior literature has, however, largely overlooked how concessive and repressive policies
interact with efforts to construct formal legality. The findings presented here suggest limitations
to contemporary understanding of both the functioning of the Chinese state and of the role of law
in China, and add to existing literature on the non-convergence of the Chinese system to existing
models of legal and political development.
In Part II I begin with a discussion of changes in China’s healthcare system that legal and
medical experts argue are to blame for the rise in disputes between patients and healthcare
providers. I then survey the confused legal landscape concerning medical disputes and introduce
some of the intermediaries influencing medical disputes. In Part III I analyze 152 cases collected
from Municipality A. In Part IV I discuss the rise of medical protest and the impact of such
conflicts on hospitals, officials, and the courts. Part V discusses the implications of my findings
for understandings of institutional development, dispute resolution, and governance in China.
II. BACKGROUND
1. China’s Healthcare System
The increase in medical disputes in China has occurred against the backdrop of dramatic
changes in China’s legal and healthcare systems.15 China’s healthcare system has undergone
dramatic changes during the reform era. Extensive literature has analyzed these complex and
multi-dimensional changes.16 I thus provide only an overview of those elements most relevant to
disputes between patients and healthcare providers.

15

I discuss changes in the legal system in detail elsewhere. Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform,
21 J. ASIAN L. 1 (2007); Benjamin Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform,
in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND (Elizabeth Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds., 2011).
16

See, e.g., CPC Central Committee & State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Yiyao
Weisheng Tizhi Gaige De Yijian (
) [Opinion of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council on Deepening Reform of the Medical Health System],
XINHUA (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-04/08/content_1280069.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2011); Karen Eggleston et al., Comparing Public and Private Hospitals in China: Evidence from Guangdong, 10

党中央国务院关于深化医药卫生体制改革的意见
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Over the past thirty years healthcare, like much of the Chinese economy, has undergone
dramatic marketization. At the beginning of the reform era most individuals in China had access
to free or heavily subsidized health care. By 2001 the public’s out-of pocket share of spending
on health had increased to sixty percent, up from twenty percent in 1978.17 As the state retreated
from funding health care in the 1980s, hospitals came under pressure to maximize revenue, in
particular through the sale of medicines and carrying out of tests.18 Excessive testing, procedures,
and the prescribing of unnecessary medication are widespread,19 as is low quality care.20
Although most urban residents have healthcare through their work, migrant workers and rural
residents do not.21 As a result rural residents have generally had to pay out of pocket up front for
healthcare — a phenomenon referred to as “pay or die.”22 Even urban residents with health
coverage are at times required to pay significant amounts up front.23 The cost of medical care, in
BMC HEALTH SERV. RES. 76 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmc2858143/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011); Richard Herd et al., Improving China's Health Care System, OECD ECON. DEPT. WORKING
PAPERS No. 751 (2010), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmlh4v2fv31-en (last visited Oct. 14, 2011);
Magnus Lindelow & Adam Wagstaff, Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review, 17 HEALTH ECON.149
(2008); Christina S. Ho, Health Reform and De Facto Federalism in China, 8 CHINA INT. J. 33, 37-38 (2010);
Yuanli Liu et al., China's health system performance, 372 LANCET 1914 (Oct. 20, 2008); Yanzhong Huang, The Sick
Man of Asia: China’s Health Crisis, FOR. AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec./ 2011, at 119; Qun Meng, Trends in Access to Health
Services and Financial Protection in China Between 2003 and 2011: A Cross-Sectional Study, 379 LANCET 805
(2012).
17

Ho, supra note 13, at 39.

18

Ho, supra note 13, at 37-39.

19

Interview 2010-6; Interview 2010-32; Interview 2010-31.

20

Interview 2009-102. See also Huifeng Wang, A Dilemma of Chinese Healthcare Reform: How to Re-define
Government Roles? 20 CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW 598 (2009), at 599-601 (arguing that a combination of continued
state management of healthcare with marketization has resulted in abuses, and noting that only twelve percent of
hospital income comes from state subsidies).

21

Ho, supra note 13; Wangchuan Lin et al., Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance: A Landmark Reform Toward
Universal Coverage in China, http://www.wanchuanlin.org/papers/URBMI.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). State
spending on healthcare also shifted dramatically toward urban residents during the reform era, with more than three
quarters of all spending on healthcare going to urban areas and institutions. Yanzhong Huang, supra note 15.
22

Jonathan Watts, Protests in China over Suspicions of a Pay-or-die Policy, 369 LANCET 93, 94 (Jan. 13, 2007),
available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2807%2960050-6/fulltext.

23

Ho, supra note 13, at 37-39.
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particular for major illnesses or injuries, has become a significant financial risk and burden, with
healthcare unaffordable for many.24 Reforms initiated in 2009 have sought to address the lack of
health coverage for rural residents. Initial evidence suggests that such reforms have succeeded in
extending coverage to more than ninety percent of the population.25 Nevertheless, low coverage
rates, in particular for catastrophic injury or illness, mean that the financial risks remain high
even for those covered by the new health care plans.26
Observers of and participants in China’s healthcare system have argued that
marketization of the healthcare system has shifted patient expectations and doctor-patient
relationships in ways that increase conflicts. Four trends stand out. First, the fact that patients
are paying out of pocket means that patients and their families expect positive outcomes. This
makes patients more likely to complain and protest about the care they receive.27 Doctors and
officials also argue that patients, especially the poor, often delay treatment until serious illnesses
are at an advanced stage, making disputes more likely.28 Doctors complain that they are blamed
when a patient has a history of illness that contributes to an adverse outcome.29 Yet they also
24

Ho, supra note 13, at 39. Despite these problems the health of the Chinese population has improved during the
reform era. Martin King Whyte & Zhongxin Sun, The Impact of China’s Market Reforms on the Health of Chinese
Citizens: Examining Two Puzzles, 8 CHINA INT. J 1, 29 (Mar. 2010). But see Yanzhong Huang, supra note 15, at
119 (arguing that increases in life expectancy in China have been low when viewed in comparative context). For a

discussion of these two different accounts of trends in healthcare, see Lincoln Chen & Dong Xu, Trends
in China’s Reforms: The Rashomon Effect, 379 LANCET 782 (2012).
25

Winnie Chi-Man Yip et al., Early Appraisal of China’s Huge and Complex Health-care Reforms, 379 LANCET
833 (2012); Qun et al., supra note 16, at 810, 812.

26

Yip et al, supra note 25 at 838 (noting that most studies have found “no measurable effect on reduction of
financial risk”). As of 2010 out of pocket expenses for patients still exceeded fifty percent. Id. at 836; see also Qun
et al., supra note 16, at 812 (noting continued high financial burden of healthcare).

浅析医疗纠纷的成因与防范

27

Liu Yi & Tian Feng, Qian Xi Yiliao Jiufen De Chengyi Yu Fangfan (
) [Brief
Analysis of the Causes and Prevention of Medical Disputes], 1 ZHONGHUA XIANDAI YIYUAN GUANLI ZAZHI (
) [Journal of Chinese Modern Hospital Management] (Sept. 2003), available at
http://journal.9med.net/html/qikan/yyglyyfyxwsx/zhxdyyglzz/2003911/ysfg/20080903014220702_15972.html (last
visited July 12, 2012) (last visited July 12, 2012); Interview 2010-24; Interview 2009-101.

现代医院管理杂志
28

Interview 2010-17.

29

Interview 2009-108.

中华
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acknowledge that failure to explain medical procedures contributes to patients’ high
expectations.30
Second, the quality of care provided remains inconsistent.31 Observers have pointed to
inequalities in standards of care between major urban hospitals and those in rural areas and have
argued that quality care is increasingly out of reach of China’s poor.32 The vast majority of
hospitals, and virtually all major hospitals, are public.33 Numerous smaller private clinics and
hospitals have emerged in recent years, often offering care at lower cost than that offered in the
public system.34 Many doctors remain poorly trained.35 Even in major urban hospitals financial
incentives may lead to low-quality care. Doctors argue that many problems result from the
excessive use of surgery.36 Lawyers complain that doctors are incentivized to prescribe
expensive medicines and treatment and consequently often fail to treat the underlying

30

Interview 2009-116.

防范医疗事故要有新理念) [Prevention of
Medical Accidents Needs New Ideas], JIANGNAN LUNTAN (江南论坛) [Jiangnan Forum],

31

See, e.g., Xu Zhihui, Fangfan Yiliao Shigu Yaoyou Xin Linian (

http://www.jnforum.com/web/article/showarticle.asp?articleid=2247 (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
32

Ho, supra note 13; Liu, Rao, Wu & Gakidou, supra note 13 (discussing increased inequality in healthcare system
and growing unaffordability for many); Eggleston et al., supra note 13 (summarizing problems in the delivery of
health services).
33

MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF P.R. CHINA, 2011 NIAN 3 YUE QUANGUO YILIAO FUWU QINGKUANG (2011

医疗服务情况

年 3 月全国

) [Report on Nationwide Health Services in March 2011], May 9, 2011, available at
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohwsbwstjxxzx/s7967/201105/51588.htm (reporting that
only 7312 out of a total of 940,409 registered hospitals and medical clinics in China are private). The number of new
private hospitals is growing, while the total number of public state hospitals has declined modestly in recent years.
Id.
34

Some allege that private hospitals often offer lower-quality care. One study, however, found that the type of
ownership was not a significant factor in determining the level or quality of care offered. Eggleston et al., supra note
13.

35

Id.

36

Interview 2009-113.
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condition.37 Regardless of the quality of care provided, the perception of inequality also
undermines trust in medical institutions.
Many hospitals are overwhelmed with patients. Because patients pay out of pocket it is
common to seek treatment in major urban hospitals, even for relatively minor ailments, and even
though urban hospitals charge more than those in rural areas.38 Many rural residents who seek
care in the cities travel accompanied by a number of family members, adding to the large number
of people at major hospitals on any given day.39 The volume of patients, lack of primary care
facilities, and profit incentives combine to mean that doctor-patient interactions are extremely
brief.40 Follow-up is rare.41
Third, distrust in the healthcare system is widespread.42 Patients believe doctors are out
to make money, and are skeptical of treatment decisions (in particular those that entail significant
cost). Most observers interviewed for this project noted a lack of trust in the healthcare system
as a source of medical disputes.43

Lawyers complain that it is common for doctors to falsify

medical records and to fail to disclose information to patients.44 The fact that most hospitals are
public contributes to distrust.45 Hospitals are arms of the state, and thus when patients die family

37

Interview 2010-6.

38

Interview 2009-101; Interview 2010-16. Recently announced reforms are designed to encourage patients to seek
treatment in rural areas first, and thus may over time alter this trend. Interview 2010-16.

39

Hospital officials also describe a culture in which the average patient is accompanied by two to three family
members—and many come with eight to ten family members. Interview 2009-116; 2010-19.
40

Interview 2009-101; Interview 2009-116.

41

Interview 2010-22; see also Interview 2009-102 (noting the need for community-based health care).

42

Ho, supra note 13, at 38 (noting that hospitals have become “fee-for-service” providers that “survive mainly on
the basis of maximizing revenue from private households”).

43

For examples, see Interview 2010-4; Interview 2010-5; Interview 2009-114; Interview 2009-123.

44

Interview 2010-5.

45

Interview 2010-6.
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members blame the hospital — and protest — believing the state will step in to provide
compensation.46
Patient trust is further undermined by the perception that corruption and questionable
practices are widespread. Estimates state that more than half of doctor income comes from side
payments from patients, kickbacks from drug companies, and moonlighting. Doctors often
demand side payments, or “red envelopes.” The practice exacerbates patient-doctor distrust both
by increasing expectations among those who make such payments and by fueling suspicion by
those who do not (or cannot) make such payments. In addition, although virtually all doctors are
registered with hospitals,47 many also work on the side either at second-tier hospitals or in other
cities to supplement their income.48
Fourth, hospital officials and doctors blame widespread media coverage of medical
disputes for encouraging patient protests.49 Doctors (not surprisingly) argue that media reports
are often biased toward patients and create unrealistic expectations regarding potential settlement
amounts for disputes.50 In 2009, for example, extensive media coverage described claims by
parents of a five month old infant who had died at a children’s’ hospital in Nanjing. The parents
alleged that the doctor on duty was playing video games and refused to come to the assistance of
the child.51 The case eventually settled for 510,000 yuan, well above the amount that would
have been recoverable in court.52 As a result, patients and families elsewhere refused to settle

46

Interview 2010-6.

47

Interview 2009-101.

48

Interview 2009-116.

49

Interview 2009-102.

50

Interview 2009-116

51

医生玩游戏致婴儿死

Li Xiang, Yisheng Wan Youxi Zhi Yinger Si (
) [Infant Death Caused by Doctor Playing
Computer Games], SINA.COM (
) (Nov. 16, 2009), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-1116/223819059951.shtml (last visited July 12, 2012).

52

新浪网

Id.
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pending claims, arguing that the outcome in Nanjing showed that proposed settlements were far
too low.53
Recent state efforts have begun to address some of the problems in the healthcare system.
Official statements call for increased state funding and for restructuring the financial incentives
facing healthcare providers.54 Significant reforms are underway in some regions. But reforms
will be costly and will take years to implement.
2. The Legal Landscape: The Two Tracks of Medical Malpractice Litigation
a. The Medical Accident Regulations and Medical Review Boards
Medical malpractice litigation in China is primarily governed by the 2002 Regulations on
Handling Medical Accidents (the “Regulations”) issued by the State Council.55 In order to
obtain compensation it must be shown that the defendant was responsible for a “medical
accident,” defined as an error causing personal injury to a patient that results from medical
personnel negligently violating relevant laws, administrative regulations, rules, standards
governing medical care, or ordinary practice.56 The Regulations contemplate four categories of
medical accident, ranging from medical accidents resulting in death or serious disability (level

53

Interview 2009-101.

54

For a discussion of proposed reforms, see Opinion of the CPC Central Committee and State Council, supra note
13; Ho, supra note 13, at 40-45; Herd et al., supra note 13; Pitman B. Potter, Dilemmas of Access to Healthcare in
China, 8 CHINA INT. J. 164, 171 (Mar. 2010); Qian Jiwei, Reforming Public Hospitals in China, 3 EAST ASIAN
POLICY 75, 77 (2011) (discussing proposed reforms to urban hospitals); Shanlian Hu et al., Reform of How Health
Care is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities, 372 LANCET 1846–53 (Nov. 22, 2008), available at
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(08)61368-9; James A. C. Sinclair, China's Healthcare Reform, 36 CHINA BUS. REV. 32
(2009).; Yip et al, supra note 25, at 833-840.

医疗事故处理条例

55

Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli (
) [Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 4, 2002, effective Sep. 1, 2002) ST. COUNCIL ORDER No. 351, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-04/15/content_358058.htm (last visited July 12, 2012) [hereafter
“Regulations”].
56

Regulations, art. 2.
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one) to those resulting in “obvious personal injury” but no disability (level four).57 Cases
involving a “medical accident” are governed by the Regulations; cases against medical providers
that do not involve “medical accidents” are not covered by the Regulations.58
The Regulations were designed in part to make it easier for plaintiffs to receive
compensation and to channel disputes into the formal legal system.59 The Regulations place the
burden of proof in medical cases on defendants. In practice, however, the Regulations are
widely viewed as favorable for defendants, for two reasons.60 First, damages available in
malpractice cases brought pursuant to the Regulations are low — significantly lower than in
other tort cases. The Regulations, while providing for a range of categories of damages,61
exclude payment of compensation for death. In contrast, damage awards in other tort cases are
governed by the SPC’s 2003 interpretation on damages in personal injury cases (the

57

Regulations, art. 4. In theory patients can also seek redress through local health bureaus, but this route appears to
be rarely used. Although health bureaus have the ability to sanction doctors and hospitals and can mediate disputes,
they cannot order hospitals to compensate patients. Interview 2009-108.

58

Regulations, art. 1.

59

Prior to 2002 medical disputes were governed by the 1987 Methods on the Handling of Medical Accidents. The
Methods permitted only a narrow scope of claims and stipulated that determinations regarding liability should be
made by local health bureaus, which also oversee the operation of hospitals. Guowuyuan Guanyu Fabu Yiliao Shigu
Chuli Banfa De Tongzhi (
) [Notice of the State Council Regarding the
Issuance of the Methods on the Handling of Medical Accidents] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jun. 29, 1987),
GUO FA (
) [St. Council Publication] No.63 (1987), available at
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=3364 (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). The Regulations were designed to
increase trust in the system by expanding the range of injuries for which compensation could be received and
shifting determinations of fault away from health bureaus. Ham and Wu, supra note 11, at 457; see also Yiwu
Renyuan Ruhe Yingdui Xin De “Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli” (
)
[How Medical Professionals Should Deal with the New “Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents”],
ZHONGGU FALÜ WANG (
) [Zhonggu Law Net], http://news.9ask.cn/yljf/201101/1039324.shtml (last
visited Jan. 10, 2011) (stating that the Regulations were designed to encourage the use of the formal legal system).
In practice, however, it seems clear that the Regulations were also designed to ensure the continued economic
development of China’s hospitals.

国务院关于发布医疗事故处理办法的通知

国发

医务人员如何应对新的《医疗事故处理条例》

中顾法律网

60

The national hospital association reportedly played a key role in drafting the Regulations.

61

Regulations, art. 50. These include compensation for medical expenses, compensation for missed work,
compensation for disability, compensation for funeral related expenses, and compensation for emotional distress.

13

Liebman – Medical Dispute Resolution in China

“Interpretation”) and by the General Principles of the Civil Law (“General Principles”).62 The
Interpretation explicitly provides for a death compensation payment of twenty times average
local income in cases in which negligent actions lead to death.63 A plaintiff seeking
compensation for a medical accident that results in death will thus generally receive significantly
less — often hundreds of thousands of yuan less — than a plaintiff seeking compensation in an
ordinary negligence action.
Second, under the Regulations determinations regarding whether or not a “medical error”
has occurred are made by medical review boards established by local medical associations.64
Courts must defer to the review boards’ determinations.65 Academics, lawyers, and judges have
pointed out a number of problems with the use of medical review boards. Review boards consist

民法通则

62

Minfa Tongze (
) [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress,
Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) PRESIDENT ORDER No. 37, available at
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=1165&lib=law (last visited July 12, 2012).

63

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi
(
) [Supreme People’s Court Interpretation
of Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2003, effective May 1, 2004), FA SHI (
) [Law Interpretation]
No. 20 (2003), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=81918 (last visited July 12, 2012). Other
differences also exist between the Regulations and the SPC’s Interpretation, including the calculation of disability
payments (where the Regulations provide modestly higher damages). Such differences are relatively minor
compared to the difference in death compensation payments.

最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释

法释

64

65

Regulations, art. 33.

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Canzhao “Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli” Shenli Yiliao Jiufen Minshi Anjian De
Tongzhi (
) [Notice of the SPC
Concerning the Trial of Civil Medical Dispute Cases According to “Regulations on the Handling of Medical
Accidents”] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 6, 2003), FA ( ) [SPC Publication] No.20 (2003),
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=78300 (last visited July 12, 2012). Interview 2010--22.
Medical review boards exist at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. Decisions of municipal review boards
can be appealed to the provincial-level review board, which may be less subject to local bias, but doing so is costly
and thus rare. In some provinces parties may also request an inspection by a medical association in a different
municipality. Interview 2009-108; Yiliao Shigu Jianding Ruhe Pinqing Waidi De Zhuanjia (

最高人民法院关于参照《医疗事故处理条例》审理医疗纠纷民事案件的通知
法

请外地的专家

医疗事故鉴定如何聘

) [How to Hire an Expert from Another Location for Review of Medical Accidents], BEIJING SHI
JINDONG LÜSHI SHIWU SUO WANGZHAN (
) [Beijing Jindong Law Firm Website] (May.
24, 2011), http://www.lvshi100.net/news.php?NewsID=45651. A very small number of cases are eventually
appealed to the medical review board under the national medical association. Interview 2009-108.

北京市金栋律师事务所网站
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entirely of local doctors and are thus likely to protect local doctors and hospitals.66 Local
medical associations are overseen by local health departments — which also oversee hospitals
and doctors.67 Hearings are brief and decisions are often short and lack detailed reasoning.68
Decisions are anonymous, with no dissents, and review board members never appear in court.69
When review boards do find error, they often find minor error — thus protecting hospitals and
doctors. The process can be expensive.70
Hospital and health department officials contest many such claims, arguing that review
boards frequently find against defendants.71 Rival claims regarding medical review boards are
difficult to assess because review board determinations are not public. Empirical evidence is
scarce. The one prior study that exists found that medical review boards found error in only 25

Wo Zhongdong, Dui Woguo Yiliao Shigu Jishu Jianding Zhidu De Ji Dian Sikao (对我国医疗事故技术鉴定制
度的几点思考) [Some Thoughts on our Nation’s Rules of Reviewing Medical Accidents], 4 ZHONGHUA XIANDAI
YIYUAN GUANLI ZAZHI (中华现代医院管理杂志) [Journal of Chinese Modern Hospital Management], No. 12
(2006), available at http://www.39kf.com/cooperate/qk/xdyygl/0612/2007-04-26-349428.shtml (last visited Oct. 28,
2011); Wang Jinfan & Wang Haiyan, Yiliao Shigu Jishu Jianding Cunzai De Wenti He Gaijin Jianyi (医疗事故技
术鉴定存在的问题和改进建议) [Problems in Technical Reviews of Medical Accidents and Suggestions for
Improvement], 20 WEISHENG RUAN KEXUE (卫生软科学) [Soft Science of Health] (2006), No. 6, available at
66

http://so.med.wanfangdata.com.cn/ViewHTML/PeriodicalPaper_wsrkx200606024.aspx; Interview 2010-5;
Interview 2010-14. The fact that adverse decisions by medical review boards can also result in administrative
punishment for doctors and hospitals further decreases the likelihood that review boards will find serious error.
Interview 2010-11.
67

Wo, supra note 59.

68

Interview 2010-15; Interview 2010-5.

69

医疗事故鉴定与医疗过错鉴定区别

Yiliao Shigu Jianding Yu Yiliao Guocuo Jianding Qubie (
) [The Difference
Between Medical Accident Inspection and Medical Negligence Inspection] (Nov. 5, 2002),
http://china.findlaw.cn/yiliao/hot/guocuojianding/24950.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2011); Interview 2010-11. This
may be appealing to judges, who may find it easier to defer to the review boards than to engage in review of their
determinations. Interview 2010-11; Interview 2009-113.
70

Hospitals will generally bear the cost if they request an inspection, an inspection is ordered by a court, or the
plaintiff prevails. Interview 2010-16.

71

Non-public reports by the Ministry of Health found that the medical review boards find error in approximately
sixty percent of cases. Interview 2010-10.
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out of 110 cases over a three year period following the enactment of the Regulations.72 Yet
actual outcomes may be less important than appearances: one doctor noted that the design of the
review boards means it is virtually impossible to convince patients to trust review board
decisions.73
b. Avoiding the Regulations: Tort Principles and Judicial Inspections
Most medical cases are brought pursuant to the Regulations. Yet numerous plaintiffs
have sought to avoid both damage limitations and medical review boards by bringing ordinary
tort claims under the provisions of the General Principles of the Civil Law and the SPC’s
Personal Injury Interpretation. In such cases determinations regarding negligence are made by
judicial inspection agencies, quasi-private entities retained by parties to the litigation.74
Hospitals, doctors, and their lawyers have criticized this practice,75 arguing that judicial
inspection bodies lack subject matter expertise,76 are poorly regulated, and are driven by profit

医疗事故争议 例技术鉴定分析
海南医学

72

Wang Ping, Yiliao Shigu Zhengyi 110 Li Jishu Jianding Fenxi (
110
) [Analysis of
Technical Reviews in 110 Disputed Medical Accident Cases], 16 HAINAN YIXUE (
) [Hainan Medical
Journal], no. 12 (2005), available at
http://so.med.wanfangdata.com.cn/ViewHTML/PeriodicalPaper_hainanyx200512112.aspx.

73

Interview 2009-101.

74

Originally established under the courts, judicial inspection offices became independent of the courts in 2005.
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Sifa Jianding Guanli Wenti De Jueding (

全国人民

代表大会常务委员会关于司法鉴定管理问题的决定) [Decision on Issues Regarding Management of Judicial

Inspections] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Oct. 1, 2005),
available at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=57068 (last visited July 12,
2012). Judicial inspection bodies are registered with the Ministry of Justice and most often are used to make
determinations regarding the severity of injury in civil cases. Many judicial inspection agencies are linked to
universities or other state entities. But the range of judicial inspections offices is broad. In Beijing, for example,
there are twenty nine different judicial inspection entities.
75

Interview 2010-4.

76

Interview 2010-12; Interview 2010-8.
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(and thus are likely to decide in favor of the party retaining them).77 Judicial inspection officials
describe their work as a necessary response to the unfairness of the medical review boards.78
The “two tracks” of medical cases have generated extensive debate in China. Hospital
officials and their lawyers argue that the Regulations should govern all claims involving
allegations of injury resulting from medical care. They contend that the existence of the two
tracks of litigation permits courts to reach any decision they desire, in particular in cases
involving sympathetic plaintiffs.79 In contrast, many lawyers, judges, and academics have
argued that the Regulations govern only serious cases of medical error and that more routine and
minor malpractice claims can be brought according to ordinary tort principles.

In practice,

some lawyers have sought to bring even cases involving major claims of medical error under
ordinary tort principles in order to avoid the medical review boards and to obtain higher
damages.80

77

Interview 2010-31; Interview 2010-2; Interview 2010-8; 2010-17; Interview 2010-11; Interview 2010-31; Lu
Yuhua, Jianding Jielun Yu Sifa Jianding Tizhi Gaige (
) [Inspection Conclusions and
),
Reform of the Judicial Inspection System], HUNAN XIANGJIAN LAW FIRM (
http://www.xj148.com/xjlw/lunwen_luyh01.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). In contrast to medical review board
procedures, judicial inspection employees do sometimes testify in court; the names of the persons making the
decisions are attached to the decision; and in some cases (albeit rare) dissenting opinions may be attached. Butong
Jianding Yijian De Chuli Guize (
) [Rules for Handling Different Inspection Opinions],
ZHONGGU FALÜ WANG (
) [Zhonggu Law Net] (Jul. 24, 2009),
http://news.9ask.cn/xsss/sfjd/sfjdcx/200907/206999.html (last visited July 12, 2012); Interview 2010-14.

鉴定结论与司法鉴定体制改革
湖南湘剑律师事务所

不同鉴定意见的处理规则
中顾法律网

78

Interview 2010-11. In most cases plaintiffs select judicial inspections. But in some cases courts may order a
judicial inspection because of doubts about the outcome in a medical review board. Interview 2010-11; Liu Taijin et
al., Jiangxi Shouli Sifa Jianding Kangbian Yiliao Jianding An Luomu (
)
[Jiangxi’s First Case with Opposing Results from Judicial Inspection and Medical Inspection Ends], DAJIANG WANG
(
) [Dajiang Online] (May 21, 2009), http://jiangxi.jxnews.com.cn/system/2009/05/21/011118129.shtml (last
visited Oct. 29, 2011).

江西首例司法鉴定抗辩医疗鉴定案落幕

大江网

79

Interview 2010-6.

80

Interview 2010-32; Interview 2009-101. In some cases lawyers may also sue in contract, again because damages
may greater.
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The SPC has indirectly endorsed the more permissive view.81 In a 2003 Notice the SPC
ordered courts to handle medical disputes “with reference” to the Regulations.82 The notice did
little to clarify what cases fit within the Regulations, stating instead that “cases not arising as a
result of medical accident” could proceed according to the provisions of the General Principles.
In a 2004 press conference, an SPC official stated that in “medical accident cases” the
Regulations apply. But, the official stated, plaintiffs may also sue under ordinary tort law for
“medical injury,” in which case the personal injury interpretation and higher damage standards
apply.83 The official thus implied that plaintiffs may determine the path under which to bring
their cases.84
c. Court Practice

81

Zhu Jianjun & Wang Hong, Shi Tongguo Liang Ze Anli Jiedu Yiliao Shigu Jianding De Falü Xingzhi (

试通过两

则案例解读医疗事故鉴定的法律性质) [An Attempt to Interpret the Legal Nature of Medical Accident Reviews
Through Two Cases], ZHONGGUO MINSHANG FALÜ WANG (中国民商法律网) [China Civil Commercial Law
Online] (Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=13055 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

82

83

Notice of the SPC, supra note 58.

Wang Lianyin, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Min Yi Ting Fuzeren Jiu Shenli Yiliao Jiufen Anjian De Falü Shiyong
Wenti Da Jizhe Wen (
) [Head of
Supreme People’s Court Civil No.1 Division Answers Reporter’s Questions Regarding the Applicable Laws in the
Trial of Medical Dispute Cases], ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN WANGZHAN (
) [Sup. People’s Ct.
Website] (Apr. 12, 2004), available at http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/21/20050709153310.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 2011).

最高人民法院民一庭负责人就审理医疗纠纷案件的法律适用问题答记者问
最高人民法院网站

84

In addition, in a 2007 speech directed at civil court judges the chief of the SPC’s first civil division – which is
responsible for medical cases – noted the paradox created by the conflict between the Regulations and the
Interpretation: the most serious cases will be tried as medical accident cases and will receive lower compensation
than minor cases that proceed according to the General Principles. The judge called for courts to proceed “according
to actual practice,” and to avoid creating situations in which there was an imbalance between the two types of cases.
He also called on courts to make sure that “interests are balanced” in medical cases. Although the judge stopped
short of explicitly stating that courts could use the Interpretation in calculating damages in medical cases, the
statement suggested that the court would endorse expanded damage awards in some medical cases. Ji Min, President,
Civ. Trial No. 1 Ct. of Sup. People’s Ct., Zai Quanguo Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Zuotan Hui Shang De Zongjie
Jianghua (
) [Concluding Remarks at the National Civil Trial Work
Forum] (Apr. 10, 2007), available at
http://law.baidu.com/pages/chinalawinfo/11/4/fef1f4b3a7264f73d85e6a6e92ea04ad_0.html (last visited July 12,
2012).

在全国民事审判工作座谈会上的总结讲话
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Provincial and local courts have taken a range of approaches, with some all but ignoring
the Regulations and others refusing to accept cases not reviewed by medical review boards. In
Beijing, for example, courts have generally permitted plaintiffs to choose between medical and
judicial inspections.85 Judges state that this is because medical review boards are unfair to
plaintiffs.86 One of the highest profile cases in recent years involved a claim by the relatives of a
professor and doctor at Peking University Hospital who had died during surgery at the hospital,
allegedly due to the negligence of trainee doctors.87 The plaintiffs relied on a judicial inspection.
On appeal following a large award for plaintiffs, the intermediate court allowed both a judicial
inspection and one by the local medical review board.88 In some cases courts have relied on
judicial inspection results that directly contradict findings of medical review panels.89 In other
decisions courts have increased damage awards in accordance with the personal injury
regulations, arguing that to do otherwise would be unfair.90
85

Interview 2010-3; Interview 2010-4.

86

Interview 2010-4.

王建国、管惠英诉北京大学第一医院) [Wang
Jianguo & Guan Huiying v. Peking Univ. No. 1 Hosp.], 2009 GAO MIN ZHONG ZI (高民终字) [Beijing High

87

Wang Jianguo, Guan Huiying Su Beijing Daxue Diyi Yiyuan (

People’s Ct. Civ. Final Decision] No. 4612 (Beijing High People’s Ct. 2010), available at http://www.mlawyers.net/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=26384 (last visited July 12, 2012); Chen Hongwei et al., Beida Yiyuan
Jiaoshou Si Yu Gongzhi Yiyuan Yin Feifa Xingyi Zhizheng (
) [Death
of Professor at Peking University Hospital Where She Worked Causes Dispute over Illegal Medical Practice], TAI
HAI WANG (
) [Tai Hai Online] (Jun. 12, 2010), http://www.taihainet.com/news/cnnews/2010-0612/542043.html (last visited Oct, 29. 2011).

北大医院教授死于供职医院引非法行医之争

台海网

88

Interview 2010-4. Regulations in Guangdong likewise permit the plaintiff to choose to pursue a case as a medial
fault case or as a medical injury case – with the former being subjected to judicial inspection and the later to
inspection by a medical review board. Guanyu Shenli Yiliao Sunhai Peichang Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti De
Zhidao Yijian (
) [Guidance on a Number of Issues
Regarding the Trial of Medical Dispute Cases Involving Damages for Injury] (promulgated by Guangdong Province
High People’s Ct., Dec. 19, 2007) YUE GAO FA FA (
) [Guangdong High People’s Ct. Publication] No. 29
(2007), available at http://www.peichang.cn/1875w.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案件若干问题的指导意见
粤高法发

89

90

Liu Taijin et al., supra note 71.

法律界叫好 医疗界叫屈

Guo Hongyu, Falü Jie Jiao Hao, Yiliao Jie Jiao Qu (
,
) [The Legal Profession Applauds
While the Medical Professional Cries Out], XINHUA (Jun. 10, 2009), http://www.gs.xinhuanet.com/bianji/200906/10/content_16769217.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
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Other jurisdictions have taken a stricter approach, either banning cases brought according
to general tort principles or severely limiting damage awards in such cases. Shanghai courts
generally follow the Regulations; as a result, as of late 2009 the maximum payout in medical
cases was 120,000 to 130,00 yuan — significantly below the amount available in medical cases
or in other jurisdictions.91 The Shanghai High People’s Court also reportedly issued a nonpublic notice stating that compensation in medical cases not brought according to the
Regulations cannot exceed 20,000 yuan — making clear that such cases should be restricted to
those alleging only minor harm or no allegation of medical error.92
China’s new Tort Liability Law,93 effective as of July 1, 2010, makes significant changes
to medical disputes, most notably shifting the burden of proof from defendants to plaintiffs.94 All
of the cases examined in this article preceded the new law. Some have argued that the new law
means that the Regulations are no longer valid and that the two track system for medical cases

91

Interview 2009-108. Plaintiffs may receive additional compensation if courts award emotional damages or support
for family members. Id.; see also Interview 2009-114 (nothing that courts will find ways to expand liability).

92

Interview 2009-108. Examples of such cases in Shanghai include slip and fall claims against hospitals, claims by
family members of patients who commit suicide while in a hospital, or failure to inform patients of the risks of
treatment decisions. Interview 2009-112.

中华人民共和国侵权责任法

93

Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Qinquan Zeren Fa (
) [Tort Law of P.R. China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective Jul. 1, 2010) PRESIDENT OF P.R.
CHINA ORDER No. 21, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2011).
94

Huang Yingshuai et al., Fayuan Gongbu Qinquan Anli: Nühai Diexia Dangang Shuai Shang Huopei 11 Wan (
:
11 ) [Court Publishes Tort Case: Girl Receives 110,000 RMB in

院公布侵权案例 女孩跌下单杠摔伤获赔 万

法

半岛网

Damages for Injuries from Falling Off Horizontal Bar], BANDAO WANG (
) [Peninsula Net] (July 7, 2011),
http://news.bandao.cn/news_html/201107/20110707/news_20110707_1425918.shtml (last visited July12, 2012); Hu
Bo, Qinquan Zeren Fa Fuyu Renmin Fayuan Zhijie Rending Tuiding Yiliao Jigou Guocuo De Quanli (
) [Tort Liability Law Gives People’s Courts Power Directly to

赋予人民法院直接认定推定医疗机构过错的权力

侵权责任法

东方法眼

Find or Infer Fault in Medical Institutions], DONGFANG FAYAN (
) [Eastern Legal Watch] (Jun. 21, 2011),
http://www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/ms/201106/23754.html (last visited July 12, 2012). The shift came after extensive
lobbying by hospitals. Interview 2010-29. For a general discussion of the impact of the Tort Liability Law on
medical malpractice law, see Zhu & Oliphant, supra note 13, at 40-49; Xi & Yang, supra note 12, at 9-11.
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will be merged into one.95 Others, however, have contended that the Regulations remain in
effect.96 In the autumn of 2011 the Supreme People’s Court circulated for comment a draft
interpretation on the handling of medical disputes.97 The draft interpretation would make clear
that inspections in medical cases may be conducted by either medical inspection agencies under
local medical associations or by judicial inspection organizations.98 The interpretation would
impose specific requirements on the content of inspection reports,99 would require that court
personnel be allowed to attend inspection hearings and ask questions,100 and would require that
at least one person who participated in the inspection attend court proceedings and answer

浅议侵权责任法在医疗损害纠纷中的适
法律快车
侵权责任法实施以后 哪些法律法规会受到影响

95

Qianyi Qinquan Zeren Fa Zai Yiliao Sunhai Jiufen Zhong De Shiyong (
) [Brief Views on the Applicability of the Tort Law in Medical Damage Disputes], FALÜ KUAICHE (
)
[Law Express] (Jun. 18, 2011), http://www.lawtime.cn/info/sunhai/shpclw/20110618102603.html; Qinquan Zeren
Fa Shishi Yihou, Naxie Falü Fagui Hui Shoudao Yingxiang? (
,
?)
[Which Laws and Regulations Will Be Affected by the Implementation of the Tort Liability Law?] (June 10, 2011),
http://www.gxmda.com/zilvweiquan/falvfagui/2011-06-10/77.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

用

医疗事故处理条例面对存亡抉择)
[“Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents” to Face Life and Death Choices], FAZHI ZHOUMO (法治周末)

96

Jiao Hongyan, Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli Miandui Cun Wang Jueze (

[Rule of Law Weekend], available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zmbm/content/201007/01/content_2182865.htm?node=7573 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

97

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Yiliao Sunhai Zeren Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi
Zhengqiu Yijian Gao (
(
))
[SPC’s Interpretation of Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Medical Malpractice
Liability Dispute Cases, Draft for Comment] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.yiliaosunhai.com/medicaltreatment/yiliaoxinwendianping/yiliaoxinwendianping3130.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2012) [hereafter “Draft Interpretation”]. In 2010 the SPC also issued a brief notice on the eve of the
effective date of the Tort Liability Law that explicitly authorized the use of judicial inspections in medical cases.
The notice did not, however, rule out the use of medical review boards or set forth procedures for determining what
type of inspection should be used. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Qinquan Zeren Fa Ruogan Wenti De Tongzhi (
) [SPC’s Notice Regarding Some Issues Concerning the Application of the PRC Tort Liability Law]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jun. 30, 2010), FA FA (
) [Ct. Pub.] No.23 (2010), available at
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=316994 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).

最高人民法院关于审理医疗损害责任纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释 征求意见稿

通知

98

Draft Interpretation, art. 14.

99

Draft Interpretation, art. 15.

100

最高人民法院关于适用中华人民共和国侵权责任法若干问题的
法发

Draft Interpretation, art. 19.
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questions from the parties to the litigation.101 Compensation in medical disputes would be in
accordance with the provisions of the new Tort Liability Law, suggesting that plaintiffs in
medical disputes would be entitled to the same damages as ordinary tort claimants, including
compensation for death.102
Although the draft interpretation has engendered some online commentary,103 the
interpretation has yet to be formally adopted and its prospects thus remain unclear. In practice it
appears that little has changed since the new law came into effect, with some jurisdictions
continuing to follow the Regulations and others willing to handle cases according to the
Interpretation.104 More significant changes, if any, will likely come only after the SPC formally
adopts a judicial interpretation on medical disputes.105
101

Draft Interpretation, art. 20. If experts from the inspection organization cannot attend they may, with prior
approval of the court, instead respond to written questions from the parties. If inspection organizations refuse to
respond courts are instructed to disregard the inspection report. Id. The draft interpretation also makes clear that
final determination of whether liability should be imposed will be by the court. Draft Interpretation, art. 25.
102

Draft Interpretation, art. 24.

103

For example, see Dui Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Yiliao Sunhai Zeren Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü
Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi Zhengqiu Yijian Gao De Jidian Jianyi (
(
)
) [A Few Suggestions for the SPC’s Interpretation of Some
Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Medical Malpractice Liability Dispute Cases, Draft for
Comment], YILIAO SUNHAI QINQUAN ZEREN WANG (
) [Medical Malpractice Tort Liability
Online] (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.yiliaosunhai.com/medicaltreatment/yuanchuangwenzhan/yuanchuangwenzhan3138.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2012).

对最高人民法院关于审理医疗损害责任纠纷案件

适用法律若干问题的解释 征求意见稿 的几点建议
医疗损害侵权责任网

104

Chen Gang, Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Yiliao Sunhai Peichang Jiufen Anjian Ruogan
Wenti De Zhidao Yijian Shixing De Lijie Yu Shiyong (
(
)
) [Understanding and Applying Beijing High People’s Court’s Guidance on
Some Issues Concerning the Trial of Medical Injury Dispute Cases, for Trial Implementation], ZHAO FA WANG (
) [Find Law Online] (Aug. 16, 2010), http://china.findlaw.cn/lawyers/article/d34931.html (last visited July 12,
2012).

问题的指导意见 试行 的理解与适用
法网

105

北京市高级人民法院关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案件若干
找

Yiliao Shigu Chuli Tiaoli Tiaowen Yu Qinquan Zeren Fa Chongtu, Zuigao Yuan Jiang Zhiding Xiangguan Sifa
Jieshi (
) [Provisions of
“Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents” Conflict with Tort Law; Sup. People’s Ct. to Develop Relevant
Judicial Interpretation], FAZHI RIBAO (
) [Legal Daily], available at
http://www.yixuefalv.com/onews.asp?id=2462 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

《医疗事故处理条例》条文与《侵权责任法》冲突 最高院将制定相关司法解释
法制日报
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3. Lawyers, Intermediaries and Insurers
A range of intermediaries help patients and their families resolve disputes and navigate
the healthcare system. These include lawyers, professional protestors, appointment touts, and
“medical introducers.” All either influence the evolution of disputes or reflect problems in the
healthcare system that give rise to disputes. In addition, insurers influence disputes largely
through their absence from the process.
a. Lawyers
Lawyers specializing in medical cases have emerged in recent years, in particular in
major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Most lawyers who specialize in medical cases are
former doctors (the Chinese bar is open to anyone with a university degree).106 Yet in less
developed legal markets it is also common to find lawyers who specialize in medical cases, most
often representing defendants.107
particular in rural areas.

108

Many plaintiffs pursue cases without legal representation, in

Lawyers say that patients generally do not retain lawyers until after

negotiations have failed to resolve a case.109
Contingent-fee arrangements are common in medical cases,110 but actual practice varies
both based on location and on individual lawyers and cases. Many plaintiffs’ lawyers will
charge a set fee up front and will then collect an additional percentage if they prevail in the
106

In Shanghai, for example, lawyers estimated in 2009 that there were approximately twenty lawyers, all with
medical training, who specialize in medical cases. Interview 2009-108. The group is divided into two subgroups.
Most represent hospitals; only a very small number have developed a specialized practice that focuses on
representing patients and their families.
107

Interview 2010-6; Interview 2010-17; Interview 2010-22.

108

Interview 2010-23; Interview 2010-4; Interview 2010-22.

109

Interview 2009-108; Interview 2010-19. This is not necessarily an advantage for the hospitals: the absence of
lawyers can make negotiation with patients and their families difficult. Interview 2009-101 (noting hospitals’
preference for discussing issues with those who have legal training).
110

Interview 2010-32.
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case.111 Lawyers in Municipality A say they sometimes use contingent fees, but more often
collect a fixed percentage of the amount in controversy.112 Some local jurisdictions have banned
the use of contingent fees in medical cases, reflecting a broader crackdown by the Ministry of
Justice on the use of such fees in cases that potentially influence social stability.113 The bans,
however, appear to have little effect in practice.114
b.

Professional Protestors

Professional protestors, zhiye yinaozhe (literally “medical chaos professionals”), operate
outside many major hospitals, soliciting patients and family members who appear to be in
distress with offers to obtain a favorable settlement from the hospital in exchange for a
percentage of the settlement or a flat fee.115 Professional protestors are most common in large
111

Interview 2010-5; Interview 2009-109.

112

Interview 2010-24; Interview 2009-113.

如何完善律师风险代理
律师风险代理若干问题探讨

113

Ruhe Wanshan Lushi Fengxian Daili (
), available at
http://www.263law.com/Article/3525.html (last visited Jul. 22, 2011) (on file with author); Feng Xingwu et al.,
Lüshi Fengxian Daili Ruogan Wenti Tantao (
) [Discussion of Some Issues Regarding
Lawyers’ Contingency Fees] (Sept. 13, 2003), http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=2054 (last visited July
12, 2012).

114

Interview 2010-5.

引入人民调解机制处理医患纠纷

115

Cui Xia, Yinru Renmin Tiaojie Jizhi Chuli Yihuan Jiufen (
) [Introducing
People’s Mediation Mechanism to Deal with Hospital-Patient Disputes], SHENZHEN SHANGBAO (
)
[Shenzhen Commerce Daily] (Jul. 14, 2009), available at http://fzj.sz.gov.cn/work/462.asp (last visited Oct. 29,
2011); Interview 2010-7. One report from Shenzhen reported that protesters charge on average fifty yuan a day to
) [Medical Introducers
protest outside hospitals. Luo Qiufang et al., Yituo Yaoshen Bian Yinao (
Transform into Medical Protestors], JING BAO (
) [Jing Daily] (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
http://finance.ce.cn/law/home/wqxw/200701/31/t20070131_10267573.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2011); see also Li
Yang, 80 Min Yinao Shougu Du Yiyuan, Gongan Juzhang Cheng Shi Tiaoxin Fazhi Shehui (80
,
) [80 Hospital Protestors Hired to Block Hospital; Police Chief Said It was a
Provocation for a Rule of Law Society], XIN WENHUA BAO (
) [New Culture Daily] (Jan. 5, 2011),
available at http://news.china.com/zh_cn/social/1007/20110105/16326633.html (noting protestors were paid fifty
yuan a day, and included children); Zhang Zhihong, Fujian Wuyi Shan Yijia Yiyuan Bu Kan Yinao Ting Ye 7 Tian
(
7 ) [Hospital at Wuyi Mountain in Fujian Closes for 7 Days Due to
Medical Protests], Dongnan Kuai Bao (
) [Southeast Express] (Jul. 13, 2007), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/health/2007-07/13/content_6369627.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).

医托摇身变医闹

晶报

公安局长称是挑衅法制社会

深圳商报

名医闹受雇堵医院

新文化报

福建武夷山一家医院不堪医闹停业 天
东南快报
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cities; in smaller cities such as Municipality A and in county towns it is harder for professionals
to operate because local authorities quickly become acquainted with repeat protestors.116
Nevertheless, hospital officials in Municipality A note that they also encounter professional
protestors, although such protestors are often friends or family members who are hired by
patients and their families.117
c. Appointment Touts and Medical Introducers
Appointment touts, haofanzi (literally “numbers traffickers”), sell appointment slots with
doctors.

Obtaining appointments at top hospitals often requires waiting in line all night at

major hospitals, and appointments with top specialists are full long in advance. In Beijing and
other major cities the high demand for appointments creates ample opportunities for touts, with
appointment slots with top doctors costing as much as 1,000 yuan on the street.118 The high
price may nevertheless be worth paying for those who have travelled to major teaching hospitals
in Beijing or Shanghai and who would otherwise have to wait weeks or months for an
appointment.119
Yituo, or medical introducers, likewise congregate outside major hospitals and solicit
patients on behalf of other hospitals — often second-tier hospitals — with promises of no delays
and sometimes lower cost. Media reports detail periodic crackdowns on yituo; in 2006, for
example, authorities detained 198 persons on suspicion of being yituo; seventeen hospitals were
placed on a blacklist for relying on yituo to attract business.120 The use of yituo may also result
in disputes, in particular when patients are taken to hospitals that lack adequate facilities. Like

116

Interview 2010-17; Interview 2010-24.

117

Interview 2010-17; Interview 2010-22.

118

Interview 2010-4.

119

Interview 2010-7.

120

家医院雇医托被曝光

Liu Mofei, 17 Jia Yiyuan Gu Yituo Bei Baoguang (17
) [17 Hospitals Exposed for Hiring
Medical Introducers], SOHU (
) (May 15, 2006), http://news.sohu.com/20060515/n243228194.shtml (last visited
Nov.15, 2011).

搜狐
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professional protestors, yituo are most common in major cities, where competition is fierce and
patients seeking care at major hospitals often face long delays.121
d.

Insurers

Insurers, in contrast, are most notable for their absence from medical disputes. Although
national and provincial authorities have encouraged (and in some cases mandated) medical
liability insurance for doctors and hospitals,122 the insurance system remains largely ineffective.
Insurance generally covers only disputes in which a medical review board has found error.123
Hospital officials complain that insurers refuse to pay claims resolved outside the courts.124
121

Interview 2010-21.

122

In 2007, for example, the Ministry of Health issued a notice to promote the development of medical liability
insurance nationwide. Weisheng Bu, Guojia Zhongyiyao Guanli Ju, Zhongguo Baojianhui Guanyu Tuidong Yiliao
Zeren Baoxian Youguan Wenti De Tongzhi (
) [Notice Regarding Issues Concerning Promoting Medical Liability Insurance] (promulgated by
the Ministry of Health, State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, and China Insurance Regulatory
Commission, Jun. 21, 2007), MINISTRY OF HEALTH PUBLICATION (
) No. 204 (2007), available at
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/column/Information_regulations/Finance_insurance/200804/t20080429_10446.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011). The notice called on some “experimental” locations to implement insurance first, while other
jurisdictions could move more slowly. In early 2011 the Ministry stated that improving medical liability insurance
was one of the major goals for the Ministry for the year. Weisheng Bu Guanyu Yin Fa 2011 Nian Weisheng
Gongzuo Yaodian De Tongzhi (
2011
) [Notice Regarding the Issuance of
Important Points in the Health Care Work in 2011] (promulgated by the Ministry of Health, Jan. 3, 2011), available
at http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohbgt/s7693/201101/50509.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2011). Some provincial and local authorities have explicitly required public hospitals in their jurisdictions to
purchase insurance. See, e.g., Zhejiang Sheng Yiliao Jiufen Yufang Yu Chuli Banfa (

卫生部、国家中医药管理局、中国保监会关于推动医疗责任保险

有关问题的通知

卫医发

卫生部关于印发

年卫生工作要点的通知

浙江省医疗纠纷预防与处理

办法) [Zhejiang Province Methods on Preventing and Handling Medical Disputes] (promulgated by the 46

th

Executive Meeting of the People’s Government of Zhejiang Province, Jan. 19, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010),
ZHEJIANG PROVINCE GOVERNMENT ORDER No. 269 (2010), available at
http://www.zhejiang.gov.cn/gb/zjnew/node3/node22/node167/node359/node365/userobject9ai112682.htm l (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011).

123

河南医疗责任险

Zheng Xiaoqian, Henan Yiliao Zeren Xian Zaodao Yiliao Jigou Ji Baoxian Gongsi De Lengyu (
) [Henan Medical Liability Insurance Runs Into Cold Reception by Medial

遭到医疗机构及保险公司的冷遇

河南商报

Institutions and Insurance Companies], HENAN SHANG BAO (
) [Henan Commerce Daily] (Sep. 8, 2009),
available at http://health.sohu.com/20090908/n266547802.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
124

大连医疗责任险为啥不吃香) [Why Isn’t Medical

Wang Jing, Dalian Yiliao Zeren Xian Weisha Bu Chixiang (

大连晚报

Insurance Popular in Dalian], DALIAN WANBAO (
) [Dalian Evening News] (Feb. 22, 2006), available at
http://dl.people.com.cn/GB/channel2/18/200602/22/40427.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); Interview 2009-101.
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Premiums are high relative to the amount of coverage obtained;125 in some cases insurance costs
exceed the amount of indemnification provided by the policy.126 Insurance companies also often
cap liabilities, excluding catastrophic cases from coverage.127 Hospital officials say that they
often must pay patients and their family in excess of the amounts covered by their policies.128
Smaller or less successful hospitals may lack the ability to pay insurance premiums; big hospitals,
in contrast, are not worried about the financial risks of litigation.129 Insurance companies have
generally not been enthusiastic about marketing medical liability insurance, viewing the area as
one with low yields and high risks due to the lack of transparency in China’s medical system.130

125

Zheng, supra note 108.

126

中国医师协会

Zhongguo Yishi Xiehui (
) [Chinese Medical Doctor Association], Qian Tan Yiliao Zeren Baoxian
(
) [Brief Discussion on Medical Liability Insurance], available at
http://2009.cmda.gov.cn/yishiweiquan/weiquanzhishi/2008-12-10/2295.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011); Interview
2010-5; Interview 2010-18. One hospital official in Shanghai complained that the hospital pays 900,000 yuan in
annual insurance premiums but can receive only 700,000 in indemnification. Interview 2009-123.

浅谈医疗责任保险

127

In Xiamen, for example, insurers set the maximum reimbursement for medical disputes at 300,000 yuan. Chu
Yan & Lin Ciwen, Jinhou Yiliao Shigu You Baoxian Gongsi Maidan, Danli Zuigao Ke Huopei 30 Wan Yuan (

今后

医疗事故由保险公司买单 单例最高可获赔 30 万元) [Future Medical Accident Bills Will be Paid by Insurance
Companies; Up to 300 Thousand Yuan Collectible for a Single Case], XIAMEN RIBAO (厦门日报) (Xiamen Daily)

(Jun. 4, 2011), available at http://biz.ifeng.com/city/xiamen/zaoanxiamen/xiamen_2011_06/04/37235_0.shtml (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011). Similarly in Shanghai, where insurance is mandatory for most hospitals, hospital officials
state that although insurers will approve payment for settlements, the maximum payable under the policies is
generally limited to 30,000 in settled cases and 200,000 in cases reviewed by medical review boards. Interview
2009-123. Such amounts are often insufficient to cover major cases. Interview 2009-124.
128

Chinese Medical Doctor Association, supra note 126.

129

Interview 2010-5.

承保风险高基础

130

Hu Xiao, Chengbao Fengxian Gao Jichu Shuju Shao, Yiliao Zeren Xian Tuiguang Zai Lengyu (
;
) [With High Risks on Insurers and Little Basic Data, Promotion of Medical
Liability Insurance Meets with a Cold Reception], GUANGZHOU RIBAO (
) [Guangzhou Daily] (Feb. 26,
2010), available at http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201002/26/t20100226_15544897.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
Insurers complain that hospitals’ preference for private settlement makes insurance more difficult to administer and
market. Wang, supra note 109. Insurance has developed particularly slowly away from major cities. In Municipality
A, for example, one hospital official reported purchasing insurance in one year, in 2004. The insurance company
subsequently refused to pay out on the policy, arguing that the hospital was filing too many claims. The hospital
bought insurance from a second provider the following year, but the insurer refused to cover any cases that had not
gone through the medical review board. The hospital eventually sued the insurance carrier and a local court

数据少 医疗责任险推广遭冷遇

广州日报
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III. IN THE COURTS: FLEXIBILITY AND COMPROMISE
A colleague and I endeavored to collect every court judgment in which a hospital or
medical provider was a defendant in a civil suit in one municipality, or shi, in a central province
from 2000 to 2009. The jurisdiction, which I refer to as Municipality A, is largely rural. We
collected 152 decisions, fifty-nine from the intermediate (appellate) court and ninety-three from
basic level (first-instance) courts.131 The cases include twenty-seven disputes in which we
obtained both first-instance and appellate decisions.132 Because the cases were collected by
judges at the intermediate court we are confident that we obtained most of the decisions issued
by that court. It is, however, possible that some of the intermediate court cases were omitted,
either intentionally or unintentionally. The intermediate court obtained lower court decisions by
requesting that each first-instance court under its jurisdiction provide all medical cases decided
during the same period. The total number of first-instance cases tried in the period was almost
certainly larger than the ninety-three collected. All but two of the lower court decisions came
from 2007 or earlier, suggesting that the intermediate court did not obtain most lower court cases
from 2008 or 2009. In addition, only twenty-nine percent of first-instance cases in our dataset
were appealed;133 this suggests that the total number of first-instance cases should be more than
triple the number of appeals.134 Nevertheless, the cases we collected constitute the largest

mediated a settlement in which the bulk of the premium was returned to the hospital. As a result, the hospital no
longer buys insurance. Interview 2010-17.
131

To protect the identity of the location I coded the cases and cite here to code number. “A” cases are intermediate
court cases; “B” cases are basic level (county) court cases.
132

Four disputes resulted in three separate court decisions; one resulted in four.

133

Twenty seven of the ninety-three first-instance cases were appealed. Because all of the basic level decisions came
from 2008 or earlier it is likely that most appeals would have been decided by the end of 2009.
134

We do not have data on civil appeals rates in Municipality A. But a thirty percent rate is high compared to
general trends in civil litigation. It is possible lower courts did not want to make all of their cases available to the
intermediate court; it is also likely that the lower courts did not collect cases diligently. Court record systems are
often imperfect, in particular in rural areas, and collecting medical cases might require a judge to read a large
volume of cases in a file room one by one.
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databases of medical cases from a single jurisdiction collected to date. Table 1 provides a
breakdown of cases collected by year.
Table 1 – Cases Collected by Year
Court
Year of decision

Basic

Total

Intermediate Level

Cases

2000

3

2

5

2001

1

8

9

2002

1

16

17

2003

5

13

18

2004

12

10

22

2005

6

13

19

2006

11

13

24

2007

3

16

19

2008

11

2

13

2009

6

0

6

Total

59

93

152

Court decisions in medical cases are often longer and more detailed than in other tort
cases. The cases we reviewed generally ranged from four to eight pages in length; a small
number of cases with complex facts were longer. Cases follow a standardized format that
includes each party’s arguments, evidence submitted, and the court’s brief legal analysis. Court
opinions in the dataset became more detailed over time.135 Yet much is also missing from the
135

For examples of early decisions with minimal analysis, see A1 (court adopted findings of medical review board
with no analysis); B10 (court concluded that P failed to show causation with no analysis). For example of later cases
with more detailed analysis, see B93 (detained analysis of causal relationship of injury and burden of proof); A47
(detailed discussion of applicable law).
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opinions — most notably behind the scenes discussions and considerations that may influence
outcomes. Nevertheless, the decisions provide insight into the types and disposition of medical
disputes that wind up in courts in rural China and the interaction among courts, medical review
boards, and judicial inspection agencies.
Four insights emerge from analysis of the cases. First, the decisions reveal a high degree
of flexibility, both in interpreting written law and in balancing the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants. Compromise decisions are common. Courts are developing competence, but this
competence does not necessarily lead to strict application of legal rules. Second, courts
overwhelmingly award some damages to plaintiffs.

There is some evidence that compensation

is tied as much to the severity of injury to the plaintiff as to the degree of wrongdoing of the
defendant. This supports arguments that courts are evolving into institutions with roles that
extend well beyond application of legal standards: courts seek to mollify parties, and perhaps to
provide low-level compensation in routine cases. Third, the cases suggest that the reality of day
to day court decisions is more complex than it is often perceived to be. Many interviewed for
this article argued that courts rarely find for plaintiffs or that the system is so biased as to render
litigation useless. Yet courts are deciding many cases. Legal representation is surprisingly
common compared to other types of civil cases in China’s courts, and appellate courts appear to
be playing a far more active role in medical cases than in other civil disputes. Fourth, the cases
provide insight into problems in the healthcare system, problems that lead not only to litigation
but also to unrest.
1.

Outcomes
The most striking aspect of the cases was that plaintiffs received some compensation in

117 of 152 reported cases, or seventy-seven percent.136 This does not mean that plaintiffs won:
most damage awards were modest, in particular when compared to plaintiff demands. 103
decisions included information on plaintiffs’ demands; plaintiffs received fifty percent or more
of the amount sought in just twenty-one cases. Courts ordered plaintiffs to pay court fees or to
136

Plaintiffs obtained compensation in 80% percent of first-instance decisions and 74% of appellate decisions. The
combined figure of 77 percent includes thirty-four settled cases and five withdrawn cases.
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share court fees with defendants in nearly two-thirds of the first-instance cases and just under
half of appellate cases, suggesting that courts believed that plaintiffs’ claims were at least
partially without merit.137 Plaintiff dissatisfaction with first-instance outcomes was also evident
from the fact that more than half of the appeals of first-instance decisions awarding damages to
plaintiffs were brought by plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the finding that plaintiffs do recover
damages in a significant percentage of cases contrasts with claims by critics of the medical
malpractice system that plaintiffs have little chance of recovery through the formal legal system.
Courts in Municipality A were most likely to impose liability in three broad categories of
cases. First, in cases in which defendants violated medical practices or standards, such as giving
overdoses of medication or using drugs despite the existence of contraindications. Second, in
cases involving outrageous or extreme outcomes resulting from common procedures, such as
incomplete removal of a placenta. Third, in cases where misdiagnosis was clear, such as failure
to diagnose cancer despite cancer cells revealed in a biopsy.
County (in rural areas) or district (in urban areas) level hospitals were the most common
defendants, and were named as defendants in fifty-five of the first-instance cases and thirty-two
of the intermediate court cases. This is not surprising: these hospitals are by far the largest
providers of inpatient care in Municipality A. Municipal-level hospitals, generally the best
hospitals in Municipality A, were defendants in seven first-instance and ten intermediate court
cases. Township health offices, which generally provide lower standard facilities than county or
municipal hospitals, were named as defendants in seventeen first-instance cases and ten
intermediate court decisions. Private clinics were named as defendants in five first-instance
cases and two appellate cases; individual doctors were named only nine and six times,
137

Regulations on court filing fees provide that the losing party to a civil law suit is responsible for paying court
) [Measures on Paying Litigation Fees] (promulgated by the
fees. Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (
St. Council, Dec. 8, 2006, effective Apr. 1, 2007), ORDER OF THE ST. COUNCIL No. 481, ch 5, §29 (2006), available
at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-12/29/content_483407.htm (last visited Nov. 15 2011). Court decisions generally
state which party shall pay the court filing fees and thus provide a rough sense of which party the court viewed as
prevailing. In many cases courts order the parties to split the fees. Yet in conversations judges also indicated that
other factors, including parties’ relative wealth, may impact the allocation of such fees.
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respectively. In suits against hospitals the names of doctors who treated the patient are rarely
mentioned.138 This reflects the fact that most doctors are employees of state-run hospitals and
are not subject to personal liability.

2.

Use of Regulations or SPC Interpretation
Courts in Municipality A were flexible in their application of the Regulations and rarely

relied only on the Regulations in resolving cases. Just twelve decisions were handled solely in
accordance with the Regulations. Forty-two of the cases relied only on the General Principles
and the SPC’s Personal Injury Interpretation, while twenty-one cited to both the General
Principles and to the Regulations in making liability determinations.139
The frequency with which the courts relied on the General Principles is notable given that
there were also signs that the intermediate court was encouraging lower courts to follow the
Regulations. In three cases the intermediate court rejected lower court decisions that had
awarded death compensation payments. In a 2008 case a lower court awarded death
compensation to the family of a patient who died of a pulmonary embolism following surgery to
remove a benign tumor. The medical review board had found minor responsibility on the part of
the hospital, determining that the defendant failed to inform the patient of certain risks and to
take necessary preventative measures. The trial court awarded death compensation of 68,380
yuan, funeral expenses of 7,586 yuan, and emotional damages of 8,196 yuan. On appeal the
intermediate court rejected the award of death compensation, awarding only funeral expenses
and emotional harm. Yet the court roughly doubled the emotional harm, apparently seeking
partially to counterbalance the elimination of death compensation damages.140

138

In some cases brought prior to the Regulations doctors were named as defendants alongside their employers. See,
e.g., A1 (suit against doctor and public health center).

139

Seventy-two of the decisions provided no citation to either the Regulations or the General Principles, three relied
on contract law and one based its decision on product liability law.

140

A61.
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In another case, from 2008, the intermediate court rejected a plaintiff’s argument on
appeal that an award of roughly 50,000 yuan for the death of a family member was too low
because it failed to include compensation for death. The medical review board had found that
defendant hospital’s failure to diagnose a bowel obstruction was the major cause of death and the
trial court imposed ninety percent responsibility on the defendant. The intermediate court stated
that the case fell squarely within the Regulations, and thus plaintiffs were not entitled to
compensation for death.141
In other cases, however, the intermediate court permitted plaintiffs to recover
compensation for death in line with the SPC’s Interpretation. In a 2009 case the intermediate
court affirmed an award of death compensation to the wife and six children of a patient who died
when a doctor apparently failed to recognize signs of a heart attack. Yet the award in the case of
52,818 yuan for death compensation, living expenses, and funeral expenses was relatively
modest, suggesting perhaps that the recovery had not been significantly increased by the award
of death compensation.142
Courts in Municipality A appeared most likely to ignore the Regulations in cases in
which defendants had failed to produce evidence or where a defendant’s conduct was
particularly egregious. In two cases courts explicitly stated that they were allowing the case to
proceed according to general tort principles (and thus were willing to assign higher damages)
because the defendant had not produced evidence, had employed unlicensed staff or had failed to
obtain consent for surgery. In one of the largest awards in the dataset,143 the Municipality A
intermediate court awarded 227,506 yuan in compensation for economic loss (including death
compensation) and emotional damages to the family of a patient who died following
141

A45. In a third case, from 2008, the intermediate court explicitly rejected a claim for death compensation by the
family of a woman who died following a postpartum hemorrhage. The court stated that the Regulations, not the
General Principles, should be used to determine damages. A47. The outcome may have been influenced by the fact
that the plaintiffs had already received substantial compensation through a settlement agreement.
142

A51.

143

A52.
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complications from surgery for cancer of the esophagus. The court largely affirmed a county
court finding that the hospital had failed to perform necessary tests prior to the surgery; the
hospital contended that such tests had been rejected by the patient’s family. The court noted that
the case had been referred to the local medical review board—which had found a class 1 error
(the most serious)—and both sides had appealed to the provincial medical review board. The
provincial medical review board never issued an opinion; it terminated the case because the
hospital failed to submit key evidence, including a video image of a liquid iodine test and the
autopsy report. The trial court found that the defendant should bear responsibility for failing to
provide the evidence and stated that the case would therefore proceed according to the General
Principles, not the Regulations. On appeal the intermediate court did not comment on the
applicability of the Regulations or on the award of death compensation, instead affirming the
judgment with a thirty percent reduction in damages based on a finding that the complications
that arose may also occur absent negligence.144

3.

Medical Review Boards
Decisions likewise suggested that courts take a flexible approach to the use of medical

review board or judicial inspection agencies. Forty-eight of the cases reported findings of
medical review boards, eighteen appellate decisions and thirty trial court decisions. Sixty-eight
percent of the medical review board decisions—fifteen in the appellate cases and eighteen in the
trial court cases—had found some error. In a significant portion of the cases, however, the
144

Similarly, in case A54 a trial court awarded death compensation to the family members of a woman who died of
cancer despite the fact the medical review board found no negligence. The court said that because the review board
found no error the Regulations did not apply. The family had argued that the hospital erred in failing to take
adequate steps after the decedent sought treatment for a lump. The medical review board found no malpractice
because the cancer was already at a late stage and the patient disregarded instructions from the hospital to obtain
follow-up treatment. But the board noted certain errors on the part of the hospital, including failure to send a tissue
sample for pathological examination, the fact that the doctor treating the patient was “qualified but unlicensed,” the
failure to keep adequate notes, and failure to obtain consent for surgery. The trial court calculated damages to
plaintiffs for such errors according to the SPC’s Interpretation, including death compensation in the damages. The
court then allocated 40 percent of the fault to defendants. On appeal the intermediate court reduced the damages
slightly because it found the lower court had miscalculated living expense allowances for the survivors—but it did
not challenge the lower court’s inclusion of death compensation for the harm suffered.
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review boards found only minor error.145 Data from court decisions are obviously incomplete;
medical review board decisions are not public, and thus we do not know how many cases were
dropped by plaintiffs after adverse decisions by the review boards.146
Use of judicial inspection institutions was also widespread. Twenty cases reported
liability determinations by judicial inspection entities—in tension with the Regulations. This
suggests that despite the widespread debate about whether judicial inspections are permissible, in
practice the use of judicial inspections continued throughout the 2000s. Patients received
compensation in nineteen of the twenty cases, somewhat more frequently than they did from
medical review boards (thirty-nine out of forty-five cases).
In fifteen cases parties directly challenged the findings of medical review boards (11) or
judicial inspection offices (4), generally unsuccessfully. Thus, for example, in a case involving
the death of a patient during childbirth, the defendant health clinic argued that the trial court’s
award in favor of plaintiffs was invalid because an inspection had been made by a judicial
inspection office, not a medical review board. The intermediate court rejected the argument,
noting that the inspection had nevertheless been done by “medical experts.”147 Courts accepted
challenges to review board or inspection decisions in just two cases.148
145

Only 18 of the decisions reported the level of error found by the medical review board. Of these, 5 were class 1 –
the most severe; 3 were class 2; 8 were class 3; and 2 were class 4, the least severe. For a description of the
categories of error, see Yiliao Shigu Fenji Biaozhun (Shixing) (
(
)) [Grading Standards for
Medical Accidents (Trial)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Health, Jul. 31, 2002, effective Sep. 1, 2002), MINISTRY
OF HEALTH DECREE No. 32 (1991), available at http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/02/content_19182.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011); Liu Hui, The Relationship between the Grading Standards for Medical Accidents and the
Grading of Disabilities (
), FALÜ BOKE (
) [Law Blog] (May. 21,
2008), available at http://www.bloglegal.com/blog/cgi/shownews.jsp?id=1700012907 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

医疗事故分级标准 试行

医疗事故分级制度与伤残等级的关系

法律博客
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In contrast, in an interview a health bureau official in Municipality A reported 111 cases referred to the local
medical review board in 2009, with error being found in fifty-three cases. Interview 2010-16.
147

A20; see also A21 (rejecting defendant’s argument that trial court decision was invalid because it relied on
findings of a judicial inspection, not a medical review board).
148

A36 (plaintiffs won compensation on appeal after challenging medical review board decision); B76 (court
accepted defendant’s argument that review board decision was incomplete and thus should not be used, but
nevertheless found for plaintiff).

35

Liebman – Medical Dispute Resolution in China

As with application of death compensation, courts appeared particularly willing to rely on
inspections by judicial inspection organizations in cases in which defendants were found to have
failed to obtain consent to procedures or in cases of egregious harm. In a 2002 first-instance
case,149 for example, the court adopted a finding of a judicial inspection bureau that the
defendant hospital should pay twenty-five percent of the damages to the plaintiffs because the
defendant had failed to inform the decedent of the risks involved in an operation to remove a
portion of the decedent’s spleen. In a 2004 intermediate court case,150 the plaintiff developed
complications from surgery to remove his gall bladder. During subsequent surgery to correct
severe abdominal adhesion the plaintiff suffered massive blood loss and entered into shock.
Subsequent to the surgery plaintiff and defendant reached a settlement agreement. Six months
later, however, the plaintiff’s condition deteriorated and plaintiff lost sight and mental function.
The plaintiff then sued. Two inspection reports were obtained. An inspection by the provincial
medical review board found no error. But a judicial inspection – presumably obtained by the
plaintiff — found that the original decision to operate was in error given the plaintiff’s
underlying condition. Although the trial court sided with the defendant, finding that the
settlement agreement was enforceable, the intermediate court rejected both the trial court
decision and the medical review board’s findings and awarded 106,766 yuan in damages, finding
that the defendants had violated the relevant medical guidelines.151

149

B24.

150

A36.

151

The court ordered the defendants to pay 75 percent of plaintiff’s damages; the reduction from 100 percent was
based on a finding that the surgery performed was “objectively difficult.” Similarly, in case A37 the intermediate
court affirmed a trial court verdict in favor of a plaintiff who sued two hospitals for failing to detect a tumor in the
stomach. A local hospital had noted two tumors on a radiology exam but had failed to detect a third, which was
clearly shown on the exam. The patient then went for surgery at a hospital in the provincial capital; the surgery
successfully removed the two detected tumors but did not find and remove the third. A judicial inspection report
adopted by the trial court found primary liability on the larger hospital for failure to detect the tumor during surgery.
The hospital appealed, arguing that the case should have been referred to a medical review board. Yet the
intermediate court found that the judicial inspection was consistent with “the spirit of” the SPC’s notice on handling
medical disputes in accordance with the Regulations.
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4.

Equity and Compromise
Court decisions reflected strong concerns about equity, with courts awarding

compensation in numerous cases absent findings of medical error. For example, courts awarded
damages in four cases that involved patients who had apparently attempted to commit or had
committed suicide.152 In one of the cases,153 the family of a patient who jumped to her death
from a hospital window alleged that the hospital was negligent for failing to secure the patient
after giving her a dose of atropine. The patient had originally been hospitalized for “mistakenly
ingesting insecticide,” common in suicides in rural China. The court found that hospital staff had
untied the patient at the family’s request but had instructed the family that four family members
needed to be present at all times to secure the patient. While being watched by a single family
member overnight the patient went to the bathroom alone and jumped out the window. The
court found that the patient herself was primarily responsible for the injuries, but nevertheless
awarded 5,000 yuan in damages to the plaintiffs, finding that the hospital ignored the potential
side effects of the drug when its staff agreed to untie the patient.154 In a second case involving a
patient who jumped to her death from a hospital window, the court likewise found that the
hospital failed to show that it had taken sufficient steps to assist the family in obtaining nursing
or chaperone services once aware of the decedent’s mental condition. The hospital argued that
the decedent was being treated for an unrelated problem and that the hospital should not be liable
for the suicide.155
Courts also imposed damages absent a finding of medical error in cases in which they
found the defendants’ conduct to be particularly egregious. One court imposed liability on a
hospital for delaying treatment—despite the absence of a link between the care given or the
152

A40, A34, A7, B84.

153

A40.

154

The case was affirmed on appeal.

155

A34. The hospital had contended that the patient had sought treatment for gallbladder disease, not mental illness,
and thus it should not be responsible for the decedent’s death.
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delay and the patient’s death—because the hospital had hired a medical introducer to entice
patients away from a neighboring hospital.156 In another case the intermediate court imposed
35,000 yuan in damages in a case in which the trial court had found no error. The intermediate
court acknowledged that the care had met the required standard, but nevertheless imposed
damages on the hospital because it found that the hospital had destroyed evidence and had
employed an unlicensed anesthesiologist.157 Similarly, a court awarded damages to a plaintiff
who sued after his wife died of cervical cancer.158 Both the municipal and provincial medical
review board found that the hospital had erred in failing to perform a biopsy. Yet both boards
also found no causation between the error and the death, because the patient already had lateterm cancer. The court nevertheless awarded damages of nearly 10,000 yuan, finding that
“improper management” resulted in misdiagnosis and thus economic harm to the plaintiff.
Courts likewise imposed liability in cases in which defendants failed to keep adequate records or
altered records.159
In other cases involving catastrophic injuries courts awarded compensation despite the
lack of a medical review board finding error. For example, the intermediate court awarded a
patient’s family 25,154 yuan in damages for "incomplete diagnosis and treatment” in a case that
arose after defendant hospital had removed a bone fragment from the decedent's esophagus. Six
days after the procedure the patient was readmitted and subsequently died from upper
gastrointestinal tract bleeding.160 In some cases the court simply split damages equally between
plaintiffs and defendants. In a 2003 case161 the intermediate court allocated economic damages
of 28,339 yuan equally between the plaintiff and defendant hospital. The court found that the
156

A31.

157

A12.

158

B14.

159

See, e.g., A2.

160

A18. The trial court had likewise awarded damages based on incomplete treatment but awarded only 8,384 yuan.

161

A8.
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plaintiff would have suffered disability regardless of whether the hospital erred, but nevertheless
imposed damages because the defendant had failed to discover a fracture. In other cases courts
showed flexibility regarding procedures to permit claims to proceed; the intermediate court
stated that the statute of limitations had not expired on the claims of six plaintiffs who sued after
they contracted hepatitis C following blood transfusions, despite a four to seven year delay from
the time they learned that they had contracted the disease to the time they sued.162 The courts
hearing the cases found that although the plaintiffs had not filed suit, they had “continually
sought settlement with the two defendants ever since they became aware of their infection”163
and “had not stopped making claims for their rights.”164
Courts were willing to overlook plaintiff conduct that may have resulted in harm in order
to ensure survivors received compensation. For example, the intermediate court affirmed an
award of 39,301 yuan to the family of a patient who died of acute drug-induced hepatitis. The
defendant disease control center treated the decedent for tuberculosis but neglected to test her
liver function. The decedent herself was fifty percent responsible because she purchased drugs
from a third-party, apparently without a prescription, in order to avoid the high cost of medicine
sold by the defendant.165 In another case involving a claim by survivors,166 the court awarded
more than 80,000 yuan in damages to the family of a woman who died during childbirth. The
plaintiff had originally sought treatment from an unlicensed doctor; she was subsequently
transferred to a township health center when complications developed. The health center then
sought to transfer her to a larger municipal hospital, but the ambulance transferring the patient
developed a flat tire, delaying treatment. The court found that the decedent should share some
fault because she sought care from an unlicensed doctor. The court found no malpractice but
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B1, A6.

163

B1.

164

A6.

165

A24.

166

B51. The court made no mention of a medical inspection being conducted.
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nevertheless imposed liability on the two defendants, finding that the doctor should be liable
because he lacked a license and the township health center should be liable for failing to conduct
surgery on the patient, resulting in a fatal delay in treatment. The hospital had argued that the
patient’s family refused to sign a consent agreement for the surgery; the court found there was no
evidence to support the argument.
In some cases courts imposed liability on defendants without stating a reason; in one case,
for example, a local court stated that although the major cause of death was a traffic accident, it
was nevertheless “appropriate” to make the defendant partially liable “because of the actual
circumstances of the case.”167 Although the court did not say so explicitly, it appeared to be
relying on Article 132 of the General Principles of the Civil Code, which permits courts to award
damages based on equitable principles in cases where no negligence has been found.

5.

Settlements and Appeals
Thirty-four of the cases we collected reported settlements. Twenty-four of these cases

were first-instance decisions; ten settlements were reported on appeal. Most were for relatively
modest amounts, ranging from 5,000 yuan to 20,000 yuan. Yet some were large—in some cases
clearly larger than would have been awarded pursuant to the Regulations. Eight settlements
were in excess of 45,000 yuan, one was a settlement for 185,000 yuan,168 and another was for
206,000 yuan. The 206,000 yuan settlement came in the case of a woman who died of a
postpartum hemorrhage at the defendant hospital. The medical review board had found a class
one error, the most serious, and that the hospital should be liable for the bulk of the harm for
failure to conduct adequate tests and for failure to diagnose the hemorrhage or treat the patient in
a timely manner. The case came to court when surviving family members sued for injuries they
said had not been covered in the settlement and for compensation for death pursuant to the
167

B53.

168

A23. Yet the amount of the settlement was significantly below the first-instance award in the case of 263,000
yuan for negligence that resulted in permanent mental disability to a newborn. B5.
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General Principles. The trial court allowed only a modest damage award of 4,000 yuan. The
intermediate court affirmed, noting that the plaintiffs had already received through settlement far
more than they would have received had they sued pursuant to the medical review board
determination.169 In another case,170 the plaintiff sought to challenge the settlement after
learning that the doctor lacked a license. A first-instance court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to
challenge a settlement, noting that the settlement was voluntary and that the amount agreed —
160,0000 yuan — was more than would have been awarded under the Regulations.
Concerns about balancing plaintiff and defendant interests were also manifest in
relatively high rates of reversal or modification on appeal. Twenty-eight of the fifty-eight
appeals to the intermediate court, or nearly half the cases, resulted in decisions being vacated or
modified.

An additional ten cases settled on appeal, meaning that roughly seventy percent of

appealed cases resulted in modification or reversal. This rate appears to be much higher than is
generally the case in civil litigation.171 National data on medical disputes are not available, but
the data suggest that intermediate courts are playing a much more active role in medical disputes
169

A47.

170

B36.

171

See, for example, Liang Cong et al., Guangdong High People’s Ct., Ershen Minshi Anjian Gaipan Biaozhun De
Diaoyan Baogao (
) [Research Report on the Standards for Modifying
) [Guangdong Courts Online] (Feb.
Judgments of Civil Cases on Appeal], GUANGDONG FAYUAN WANG (
6, 2009), http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/sfdc/t20090206_22549.htm (showing the rate of modification decrease from
27.34% in 2000 to 19.68% in 2007 in Guangdong Province); Yang Honghui et al., Shaoyang: Ershen Minshi Anjian
Lianxu 3 Nian San Sheng Er Jiang (
3 “
”) [Shaoyang Saw Three
Measurements Go Up and Two Others Go Down among Civil Cases on Appeal for Three Consecutive Years],
) [China Courts Online] (Jul. 8, 2011),
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (
http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/fayuanpingtai/anjianshenli/minshishenpan/html/1074/2011-07-08/content-98833.html
(last visited July 12, 2012) (showing the rate of modification at Shaoyang Intermediate People’s Court of Hunan
Province decreased over three years to 18.8% in 2010). The fact that the modification/reversal rate is factored into a
trial judge's performance evaluation, and thus affects pay and promotion, at least in part discourages reversals or
modification. See Qian Xianliang, Falü Zhuanjia Chen Guangzhong: Falü Kaoping Jizhi Daozhi Ershen Gaipanlü
Di (
) [Legal Scholar Chen Guangzhong: Judges Evaluation
System Causes Low Modification Rates in Cases on Appeal], ZHENYI WANG (
) [Justice Online] (Jul. 12,
2008), http://www.jcrb.com/zhuanti/fzzt/ntyydlt/ntyydzxbd/200807/t20080712_36692.html (last visited July 12,
2012).
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than in other areas. In numerous cases the intermediate court affirmed a lower court decision in
favor of a plaintiff but reduced damages modestly, suggesting perhaps an effort to appease the
appellant.172 Likewise in some cases in which plaintiffs appealed the intermediate court
increased damage awards.173
Plaintiffs and defendants brought roughly equal numbers of appeals: twenty-five of the
appeals were filed by plaintiffs and thirty-three by defendants. The parties appeared to prevail at
roughly similar rates. Plaintiffs received additional awards in sixteen of the twenty-five appeals,
while defendants succeeded in having awards reversed or modified in fourteen of thirty-three
appeals. Certain categories of cases appeared particularly likely to result in appeals, including
cases in which a patient died,174 cases involving large damage awards,175 serious injuries with
small damages,176 and where there were disputes among multiple defendants.177
For example, in a 2006 case,178 plaintiff sued after her uterus was removed following
extensive bleeding in childbirth. A judicial inspection center decision found that the defendant
hospital had not erred and that complications resulted from plaintiff’s failure to undergo prenatal checkups and her late arrival at the hospital. The trial court rejected the inspection
decision, finding that the medical records the center had used to make its decision had been
modified and that the hospital had failed to direct the patient to undergo comprehensive checkups. The intermediate court affirmed the trial court decision but nevertheless reduced the
172

See, for example, A51 (reducing defendant hospital’s liability for failure to diagnose a heart attack from 100
percent to sixty percent because of the acuteness of the patient’s illness); A54; A59.
173

See, e.g., A56.

174

See, e.g., A1.

175

See, e.g., B1.

176

A16. A patient was awarded only 9,500 yuan after a doctor’s failure to send a tissue sample for pathological
examination delayed discovery of a malignant tumor and led to amputation of the patient’s arm.
177

A29; A30.

178

A26.
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defendant’s liability, from 111,000 yuan to 92,0000 on the grounds that recognizing the
plaintiff’s condition was “a gradual process.”179
As is standard in China, cases that were vacated and remanded generally provide no
explanation of the reasons for doing so.180 Yet occasionally intermediate court decisions
provided some insight into the types of problems that arose in the lower courts. In one 2003 case
the intermediate court vacated and remanded a decision, noting that the lower court had violated
procedures by issuing a decision despite the fact that the defendant had requested a medical
inspection and the medical review board had yet to issue its findings.181
Cases from Municipality A also show another characteristic of medical disputes: parties
often seek to reopen cases when new expenses are incurred. Such claims sometimes succeed.
For example, in a case first brought in 2006 the trial and intermediate courts awarded damages to
a child who developed cerebral palsy as a result of the umbilical cord becoming entwined around
his neck prior to birth. The medical review board found minor error on the part of defendant
hospital for failure to conduct a caesarian section and for failure to provide adequate
resuscitation after the birth. The trial court found the defendant responsible for forty percent of
the harm and awarded 118,895 yuan in economic damages plus 20,000 in emotional harm. On
appeal the intermediate court found that the trial court had over-estimated the plaintiff’s losses
and reduced the award to 55,840 yuan, plus the additional 20,000 yuan for emotional damages.182
Yet two years later the plaintiff returned to court seeking additional damages, arguing that the
defendant should pay for the expenses arising from additional hospitalizations that the plaintiff

179

A26. The court reduced liability for medical costs by ten percent and also reduced emotional harm payments
from 20,000 yuan to 10,000 yuan—without explanation.
180

See, e.g., A4; A28. Courts sometimes send a non-public letter to the lower court indicating the problems with
the lower court decision that resulted in the remand. See, e.g., A28.

181

A11.

182

A42.
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underwent subsequent to the original decision. The lower court agreed, ordering the defendant to
pay forty percent of such expenses, or 19,967 yuan; the intermediate court affirmed.183

6.

Damages
Median and mean awards varied significantly each year, reflecting both the small number

of cases awarding damages each year and the influence of large awards. Many years included a
single large award, often in cases resulting in permanent mental or physical disability at
childbirth,184 cases involving a patient’s death,185 cases in which plaintiffs contracted hepatitis C
through a blood transfusion,186 or in cases of egregious malpractice.187 Nevertheless examination
of the largest known award for each year suggests modest expansion in damage awards. The
largest awards came in 2007 and 2005. The largest award, for 316,438 yuan, was awarded in
2007; it was reduced on appeal to 227,506.188 The second largest was 283,698.40, in 2005.189
Table 2 shows the median and mean damage awards for cases in each year in the study.

183

A43.

184

See, for example, B5 (283,698.40 yuan damages for mental disability at birth); B55 (132,490.40 yuan for
cerebral palsy at birth).

185

B76 (316,438.02 yuan for patient death, reduced on appeal in A52 to 227,506.61); A34 (119,549.76 yuan for
patient death.
186

See, e.g., B6 (190,000 yuan), B4 (155,851.22 yuan), B1 (125,521 yuan).

187

For example, in case B77 the trial court awarded 127,825 yuan in damages after the defendant hospital removed
plaintiff’s right oviduct without the patient’s permission during treatment for an extra-uterine pregnancy; because a
prior surgery had removed the left oviduct, the procedure left the plaintiff infertile. The medical review board found
that the defendant should have pursued a more conservative treatment strategy. The intermediate court reduced the
award to 97,228, still one of the larger awards in the dataset. A59.
188

B76; A52.

189

B5.
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Table 2 – Mean and Median Damage Awards
￥

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

5

8

16

16

19

17

20

18

13

6

Count
Mean

9,602

Median 4,000

30,889 8,505

24,480 46,473 62,720 48,039 46,180 52,826 46,233

9,000

17,221 34,339 25,490 35,402 12,494 15,793 38,409

8,192

Overall: Count = 138 (including cases awarding no damages); Mean = 40,060 yuan; Median =
18,000 yuan
Courts awarded emotional damages or reported settlements that included compensation
for emotional harm in thirty decisions, covering twenty-seven separate cases.190 Emotional
damage awards ranged from a low of 1,000 yuan191 to a high of 50,000 yuan,192 although in some
cases with large damage awards the courts did not specify the breakdown between pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damages. Courts almost never provided explanation for awards of emotional
damages.193 Courts appeared to use emotional damages to compensate plaintiffs in serious cases
(often fatalities) or to make up for the fact that courts cannot award death compensation. For
example, the family of a patient who died following misdiagnosis of an intestinal obstruction

190

In three cases awarding emotional damages the dataset includes both first-instance and appellate decisions.

191

B49.

192

B6.

193

In only one decision, A42, did the court explicitly state that the defendant had inflicted emotional harm on the
plaintiff. In one case, A9, the court said it was rejecting emotional harm damages because the patient had suffered
no permanent disability or organ failure.
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received an award of 55,866 yuan.194 The court, noting that it was not permitted to award death
compensation, stated that 44,382 of the award was compensation for emotional harm.195

7.

Sources for Grievances: China’s Healthcare System
The cases provide insight into problems in China’s healthcare system. Numerous cases

reported that patients’ medical condition at least in part resulted from their ignoring instructions
for further treatment or testing or from patients seeking medication from a third party at a
reduced rate.196 Such cases likely result at least in part from the cost of health care.197 In a 2004
case, for example, the intermediate court reduced a damage award against a local hospital by
nearly half, to 14,976 yuan. The hospital had been negligent in prescribing non-approved eye
drops — but the plaintiff’s failure to seek care in a timely manner was the primary source of the
injury.198 In a 2006 case the intermediate court found that a plaintiff should bear sixty percent of
the loss resulting from the amputation of her arm following the discovery of a malignant lump.
The patient had failed to complete radiotherapy as instructed, again likely because of the cost of
the procedure.199 Similarly, in a case from 2001,200 the court rejected claims for malpractice
after the decedent died of a brain edema following a car accident. The court noted that doctors
had twice suggested a CT scan, but that the family members had refused because they lacked
sufficient funds.
194

A45.

195

A45; see also A42, B55, A9. In another case the intermediate court reduced a damage award on appeal noting
that plaintiffs had received death compensation and thus could not also receive damages for emotional harm. A20.
196

It is likely that a significant portion of such secondary market medication is either fake or of low quality.

197

Fifteen decisions fit clearly into this category—covering 11 cases. A23 (reviewing B5), A31 (reviewing B8), A40
(reviewing B84), A34, A16, A24, A58, A54 (reviewing B78), B51, B56, B63.
198

A13.

199

Three separate clinics and hospitals that had treated the patient were also liable for failing to test the tumor or for
failing to completely remove it during prior treatment. A16; see also A31 (stating that the decedent should bear
some of the responsibility for her death because she sought treatment at a late stage).
200

B63.
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Ten decisions covering nine disputes involved the unlicensed practice of medicine —
sometimes by staff in state-run hospitals.201 In a 2007 intermediate court case202 plaintiffs sued
after their husband and father died of alcohol poisoning. The medical review board found that
defendant health center was liable because the decedent had been improperly treated by someone
who lacked a license. The trial court accepted the finding and awarded damages of 72,000 yuan
according to the Regulations. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the court should have
awarded damages pursuant to the General Principles. They argued that because care had been
performed by an unlicensed person the court should not apply the Regulations. The appeals
court rejected the argument, stating that case was still one brought under the Regulations because
the defendant health center had provided substandard care.203 In another case, from 2004,
plaintiffs were the survivors of a patient who died of shock during surgery for pneumonia at a
county traditional Chinese medicine hospital. The trial court found no liability, because the care
provided by the defendant hospital met the required standard. On appeal the intermediate court
vacated the decision and awarded 34,339 yuan in damages. The court found that although the
care met the required standards, the defendant hospital should nevertheless be liable because it
destroyed evidence and because its anesthesiologist was unlicensed.204
Other cases involved doctors who moonlighted, encouraging patients to obtain treatment
outside of major hospitals, or patients who sought medical assistance from a friend or neighbor.
Thus, for example, a court found plaintiffs had sought assistance from a neighbor who was an
201

A12, A41, A58, A54 (reviewing B78), A46, B36, B51, B64, B75.

202

A41.

203

Case B36 likewise involved a claim of practice without a license. The plaintiffs’ family member died from
anaphylactic shock following the administration of intravenous antibiotics. The plaintiffs had sought to reopen a
settled case after they learned that the defendant staff member of a local health office lacked a license; the court
rejected the claim, finding that the amount agreed exceeded the amount payable under the Regulations.
204

A12. In another case, B75, against a family planning office, the court found the decedent’s death was the result of
an underlying liver condition and was not, as plaintiffs alleged, the result of herbal medicine given by a doctor at the
family planning bureau. The court nevertheless awarded 75,390 yuan in damages because it found that the defendant
family planning services office was providing services beyond those it was authorized to provide.
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employee (apparently not a doctor) of a local hospital after the plaintiffs’ daughter was bitten by
a dog.205 The defendant administered the rabies vaccine but did not administer both serum and
immunoglobulin. The family obtained the first two shots from the neighbor and a third shot
from a retired doctor — all it would appear in an effort to avoid paying for the shots. Their
daughter subsequently died of rabies. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. Although it
found that the neighbor had broken the law by administering the vaccine without the monitoring
and instruction of a disease control organization, the court nevertheless found that the neighbor
had no duty to the plaintiffs because she administered the shot as a favor, and that the actions of
the retired doctor did not cause the girl’s death. Claims against two hospitals that subsequently
treated the decedent failed because there was no causal link to the death.
Likewise, in an intermediate court case206 plaintiffs took their daughter to the local
county hospital for treatment of tonsillitis. Following two days of treatment at the hospital they
then took their daughter to an unlicensed doctor to continue treatment. The unlicensed doctor
apparently aimed to continue the infusion the girl had received in hospital, but administered two
separate infusions at the same time, instead of on different days; the patient died of anaphylactic
shock. The family settled with the unlicensed doctor; a claim against the pharmacy that sold the
infusion solution failed because no problems were found with the quality of the medication. The
court noted that the decedent’s mother had taken the victim to an unlicensed doctor and that there
had been no showing of a quality problem with the fluid that was used.

8.

Lawyers and other Representatives
Most litigants in medical cases in Municipality A were represented in court, although not

always by a lawyer. Plaintiffs in forty-nine of ninety-three first-instance cases were represented

205

B32.

206

A58.
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by a lawyer; an additional twenty-six were represented by a basic level legal worker.207 An
additional five were represented by individuals identified as “cadres” — justice department or
public security department officials.208 Defendants were represented by lawyers at a higher rate:
seventy-eight cases reported that defendants were represented by lawyers.209 These rates of
representation appear high compared to other recent studies on civil cases, suggesting that
litigants are more likely to retain lawyers in medical disputes than in more routine civil cases.210
Taken together, the 152 decisions from Municipality A provide insight into the evolution
of China’s courts as they confront increasingly complex and contentious issues. Innovation and
flexibility are common, but such innovation serves to pacify parties, not break new legal ground
or assert court autonomy. Courts emphasize achieving equity in adjudication and largely reject
winner-take-all outcomes. Data on enforcement rates were not available, but interviewees did
not raise enforcement of judgments as a major issue in medical cases. The cases suggest that
arguments that courts are largely irrelevant in medical cases are overstated. Some cases are
being resolved in the courts, with courts largely seeking to balance competing interests. Yet
such decisions appear to do little to shape how disputes are resolved outside the courtroom.
207

Basic level legal workers are paraprofessionals who operate largely in rural areas. They generally have some
legal training and are licensed to provide representation in civil cases.
208

In ten cases plaintiffs were represented by individuals whose employment status was not identified—seven of
whom were family members. Only three plaintiffs lacked representation. On appeal plaintiffs likewise largely had
representation: of the 59 appellate cases, 26 reported plaintiffs being represented by lawyers, 15 by basic level legal
workers, one each by a professor and by a cadre, and seven by unidentified individuals. Nine appellate cases stated
that plaintiffs lacked legal representation.
209

In addition, two cases involved representation by a basic level legal worker, two by a “legal consultant,” one by
an official, and nine by hospital management. On appeal rates were similar, with hospitals being represented by a
lawyer in 44 of 59 appeals.

农村法律服务实证研究

210

See, for example, Wang Yaxin & Wang Ying, Nongcun Falü Fuwu Shizheng Yanjiu (
)
[An Empirical Study of Legal Services in Rural Areas], 2 TSINGHUA L. REV. 5, 59 (2008), available at
http://doc.baidu.com/view/8ab0c44efe4733687e21aab5.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (finding that in two rural
counties in Guizhou Province only 24.3% and 19.8% of civil case litigants had legal representation); Bacheng
Beijingren Da Guansi Bu Qing Zhen Lüshi (
) [Eighty Percent of Beijing Residents
Do Not Hire Real Lawyers for Litigation], available at
http://www.365u.com.cn/wenzhang/detail/article_58734.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (reporting that, according
to the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau, in 2003 only 16% of civil case litigants in Beijing hired lawyers).

八成北京人打官司不请真律师
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IV. ON THE STREETS: PROTEST AND SETTLEMENT
The cases from Municipality A provide insight into how courts resolve disputes once
they reach the courtroom. Hospital and public health officials say they are far more concerned
with how disputes are resolved outside the courtroom, in particular in the face of protests. Only
one case from Municipality A explicitly mentioned violence by a patient’s family member.211
Yet violence and protest cast a strong shadow over medical disputes in Municipality A and
elsewhere.
1. Protest, Violence, and Responsiveness
The rise in protests and in violence concerning medical disputes has been widely reported in
the Chinese media over the past decade, with the term yinao, or “medical chaos,” used to refer to
incidents of violence or protest arising from medical disputes. Media reports and interviews
portray protest as a common tool for patients and family members seeking compensation from
hospitals.212
211

After the death of a newborn baby, the family refused to pay medical expenses; family members also physically
attacked the hospital. The hospital sued for the unpaid medical expenses and for damages caused in the attack. The
family countersued for medical malpractice. The court ordered the family to pay seventy percent of the cost of
treatment, but also ordered the hospital to pay thirty percent of the loss to the family resulting from the malpractice.
The result was a judgment in the hospital’s favor of roughly 17,000 yuan. B68. The court stated that the claim for
property damages should be brought in a separate case.
212

医疗纠纷引发刑案增多

Deng Xinjian, Yiliao Jiufen Yinfa Xingan Zengduo, Xianxing Falü Buli Jiejue Maodun (
) [Medical Disputes Lead to Increase in Criminal Cases; Existing Laws Not Good for

现行法律不利解决矛盾

法制日报

Conflict Resolution], FAZHI RIBAO (
) [Legal Daily] (Jul. 24, 2007), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-07/24/content_6421115.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); Wang Leyang,
supra note 6. Reports note that most protests concentrate on level two hospitals – because smaller hospitals have no
resources to pay protest demands and larger hospitals tend to have closer ties with local authorities. Shen Kui
Zhuanjia Tan: 2008 Nian Guangdong Sheng Yinao Shijian De Tedian (
:
2008
) [Expert Shen Kui: Discussing the Characteristics of Hospital Protests in Guangdong Province in 2008], NANGUO
LÜSHI SHALONG (
) [South China Lawyer Salon],
http://www.nglssl.com/article/articleshow.asp?articleid=6323 (last visited Jun. 8, 2011). But hospitals of all sizes
appear to be targets, and officials at major public hospitals in Shanghai, Wuhan, and in Municipality A all cited
violence as common.

点

沈奎专家 谈

年广东省医闹事件的特

南国律师沙龙

50

Liebman – Medical Dispute Resolution in China

Media accounts from across China describe protests by family members of injured or
deceased patients. Following the death of a 71-year old man in Heyuan, Guangdong, seventy
friends of relatives forcibly removed the body from the hospital morgue and placed it at the
entrance of the hospital.213

In Taizhou, Jiangsu, more than 100 villagers blocked hospital

entrances and staged a protest following the death of a fellow villager, allegedly following the
administration of incorrect medicine resulting in multiple organ failures.214 In Fujian, protestors
forced a maternity hospital to close for seven days in 2007 after alleged mishandling of a
stillbirth resulted in a woman becoming infertile; family members blocked the hospital entrance
and placed the remains of the infant in a freezer in the hospital lobby.215 In Zhangjiagang, in
Jiangsu, more than a thousand people protested after multiple deaths at a hospital.216 A report
from Sichuan described how a family left a newborn baby at the hospital for two months and
213

Huang Dan & Huang Guangming, Zhiyi Yiyuan Qiangjiu Budang Zhi Shangzhe Siwang, Jiashu Kangshi Gao
) [Suspicion that Hospital’s Improper Emergency
Yinao (
Treatment Caused Injured Patient’s Death Prompted Family to Engage in Medical Protest by Carrying the Body],
HEYUAN WANBAO (
) [Heyuan Evening News] (Mar. 25 2010), available at
http://news.hyorg.com/2010/0325/29617.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
214

质疑医院抢救不当致伤者死亡 家属扛尸搞医闹
河源晚报

台州

Feng Changhua, Taizhou Kaifa Qu Jingfang Chenggong Chuzhi Yi Qi Raoluan Yiyuan Yiliao Zhixu Shijian (
) [Police of Taizhou Development Zone Successfully Handled

开发区警方成功处置一起扰乱医院医疗秩序事件

中国台州网

an Incident Disturbing the Order of Medical Services at a Hospital], ZHONGGUO TAIZHOU WANG (
)
[China Taizhou Online] (May 5, 2010), http://news.taizhou.com.cn/news/2010-05/05/content_247613.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011).

215

福建一家医院不堪医闹停业 天
飞华健康网

Fujian Yi Jia Yiyuan Bu Kan Yinao Ting Ye 7 Tian (
7 ) [Unable to Deal With
Hospital Protests, a Hospital in Fujian Closed for 7 days], FEIHUA JIANKANG WANG (
) [Feihua Health
Online] (Aug. 8, 2007), http://doctor.fh21.com.cn/zhuanti/ynzt/20070717/1508185.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

216

江苏张家港市因医患纠纷引

Jiangsu Zhangjiagang Shi Yin Yihuan Jiufen Yinfa Qian Yu Minzhong Jiju Shijian (
) [More Than One Thousand People Gathered to Protest a Hospital-Patient Dispute in
Zhangjianggang City of Jiangsu Province], XINHUA (Dec. 6, 2010), available at
http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2010/12/201012060643.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); 11.28
Zhangjiagang Diyi Renmin Yiyuan Xiaohai Siwang Shijian (11.28
) [Nov. 28
Incident of a Child’s Death at Zhangjianggang No.1 People’s Hospital], BOXUN (
) [Boxun News] (Dec. 1,
2010), http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2010/12/201012012301.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011);
Zhangjiagang Diyi Renmin Yiyuan 12 Yue 5 Ri You Guangda Shimin Zizu De Xianhua Huodong (
12 5
) [A Group of the General Public Gathered on their own for a
Ceremony to Present Flowers at Zhangjianggang No.1 People’s Hospital on Dec. 5], SINA BLOG (
) (Dec. 5,
2010), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6ec77c980100n2fu.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

发千余民众集聚事件

医院 月 日由广大市民自组的献花活动

张家港第一人民医院小孩死亡事件
博讯
张家港第一人民
新浪博客
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regularly organized dozens of protesters to demand compensation after the baby’s mother died
during childbirth.217
Violence is common. Officials in Guangdong reported in 2006 that on average there was
one violent incident at a hospital in the province each day.218 A report from Jiangsu said that that
ninety percent of the approximately 100 “major medical dispute incidents” in Nanjing each year
turned violent.219 One posting to a Wuhan newspaper web site by a person self-identifying as a
hospital employee described a protest in Shiyan, in Hubei Province, in which fifty protestors
attacked hospital staff, beating and pouring boiling water on them, pulling hair, spitting, and
forcing the doctors to kiss the body of the deceased patient. The protestors demanded that the
hospital establish a funeral shrine for the deceased in the hospital lobby and threatened to bury
the doctors along with the deceased. Police initially called to the scene subsequently fled out of
concern for their own safety.220 In Guangdong a hospital director had to be rescued by local
police after he was detained for 26 hours by a group of 100 protestors.221 Reports on family

217

Ma Limin, Zhengfu Zhudao Bumen Liandong Jian Duli Disan Fang Tiaojie He Baoxian Peifu Jizhi, Suining
Pojie Yinao Jiufen Tiaojie “Liang Da Zhangai” (
,
“
”) [Lead Government Agencies Jointly Create Independent Third-Party Mediation and
Insurance Payment Mechanisms, Cracking Two Major Obstacles to Hospital-Patient Dispute Resolution in Suining],
FAZHI RIBAO (
) [Legal Daily] (Jan. 6, 2011), available at
http://finance.ifeng.com/roll/20110106/3161057.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

解医患纠纷调解 两大障碍
法制日报

218

政府主导部门联动建独立第三方调解和保险赔付机制 遂宁破

Liao Huailing et al., Heishili Jieru “Yinao” Geng Changkuang, Zuigao Suopei 1500 Wan (

黑恶势力介入医闹

更猖狂 最高索赔 1500 万) [Black Forces Get Involved in “Medical Chaos,” Making Incidents More Rampant and
Pushing Compensation to a New High of 15 Million Yuan], YANG CHENG WANBAO (羊城晚报) [Yang Cheng
Evening News] (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.chinanews.com/jk/kong/news/2008/10-06/1401884.shtml
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

219

Deng, supra note 197.

220

Shiyan Shi Yun Xian Anyang Zhen Weisheng Yuan Fashengle Yiqi Ling Ren Zhenjing De “Yinao” Shijian, Duo
Ming Yiwu Gongzuozhe Zaodao Weigong (
“
”
) [A Shocking Hospital Protest Occurred at Anyang Town Health Center of Shiyan City, Yun
County, Where Numerous Medical Staff Were Besieged], http://baoliao.cnhubei.com/board-8-thread-12405-detail
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).

医务工作者遭到围攻
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members beating doctors and other hospital staff are common.222 A hospital director in Shanghai
described a protest in which twenty family members stormed into an operating room, throwing
water at doctors and nurses; in another case patients protested in the intensive care unit,
disrupting doctors’ ability to care for other patients.223 Facing rising threats from protestors, one
hospital issued doctors with helmets; other doctors reportedly wore bullet proof vests.224 One

221

禁

Guangzhou Bai Ren Weidu Yiyuan, Yuanzhang 26 Xiaoshi Bei Ruanjin (

广州百人围堵医院 院长 26 小时被软

) [Over a Hundred People Blocked Hospital in Guangzhou; Hospital President Confined for 26 Hours], FEIHUA
JIANKANG WANG (
) [Feihua Health Online],
http://doctor.fh21.com.cn/zhuanti/ynzt/20081217/08321611.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

飞华健康网

解决医患纠纷路在何方
大众日报
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Li Yuan, Jiejue Yihuan Jiufen Lu Zai Hefang (
) [Where is the Way for Resolving
Hospital-Patient Disputes], DAZHONG RIBAO (
) [Dazhong Daily] (Jan. 12, 2011), available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-01-12/040521800444.shtml (last visited July 12, 2012) (family attacked doctors and
security guards, leading to four arrests); Li Yang, 80 Ming Yinao Shougu Du Yiyuan, Gongan Juzhang Cheng Shi
Tiaoxin Fazhi Shehui (80
,
) [80 Hospital Protestors Hired to
Block Hospital; Police Chief Calls it a Provocation to a Rule of Law Society], SICHUAN XINWEN WANG (
) [Sichuan News Online] (Jan. 5, 2011), available at
http://news.china.com/zh_cn/social/1007/20110105/16326633.html (last visited July 12, 2012) (sixty-one persons
detained following violent protest at hospital in Jilin); Liu Shaolong, Baiyu Ren Yin Chanfu Siwang Daza Yiyuan Xu:
:
17
) [More Than a Hundred
Jinfang Zhua 17 Ming Weishou Zhe (
People Attacked Hospital in Response to a Pregnant Woman’s Death Continued: Police Arrested 17 Who Led the
Action], XIAO XIANG CHENBAO (
) [Xiao Xiang Morning News] (Jul. 24, 2010), available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2010-07-24/023620746481.shtml (last visited July 12, 2012); Xinhua Xian Renmin Yiyuan
Daza Shijian Neimu (
) [Inside Story of the Violent Incident at Xinhua County
People’s Hospital], http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/no110/1/102583.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011);
Hong Qiwang, 200 Min Sizhe Jiashu Danao Xian Renmin Yiyuan, Xian Zhengfu Chu Qian Peichang (200
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网
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百余人因产妇死亡打砸医院续 警方抓 名为首者
潇湘晨报
新化县人民医院打砸事件内幕

名死者家

属大闹县人民医院, 县政府出钱赔偿) [200 Family Members of the Deceased Attacked County People’s Hospital;
County Government Pays for Damages], YANG CHENG WANBAO (羊城晚报) [Yang Cheng Evening News] (May 19,
2010), available at http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2010-05-19/150420304817.shtml (protestors destroyed obstetrics unit
at hospital following death during delivery).
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Deng, supra note 197; Shanghai Xinhua Yiyuan Yihuan Jiufen Xu, Jingfang Cheng Jiashu “Ruoshi Qunti” (
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新华医院医患纠纷续, 警方称家属”弱势群体”) [Continued Coverage of Hospital-Patient Dispute at Shanghai
Xinhua Hospital; Police Call Patient’s Family “Weak Group”], LIAOWANG XINWEN ZHOUKAN (瞭望新闻周刊)

[Outlook News Weekly] (Feb. 11, 2011), available at
http://news.iqilu.com/shehui/fazhizongheng/20110211/411460.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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hospital announced that it was installing locking devices on windows to prevent protestors from
threatening to jump from windows.225
Bodies of the deceased are central to many protests. Lawyers report that families will
often refuse to move the body out of the hospital until a settlement has been agreed.226 Often
families will refuse to permit an autopsy,227 instead insisting on compensation up front. The use
of bodies in protest draws directly on historical traditions of using bodies of the deceased as a
last, but often effective, resort for those seeking compensation from more powerful figures.228
Doctors and nurses have also taken to the streets to protest violence. In Luoyang, nurses
protested after a local Party official illegally imprisoned four nurses following the death of a
family member in a local hospital, allegedly due to the nurses’ inattention to the patient while

医院封窗防病人跳楼
羊城晚报
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Yiyuan Feng Chuang Fang Bingren Tiao Lou (
) [Hospital Seals Windows to Prevent
Patients from Jumping], YANG CHENG WANBAO (
) [Yang Cheng Evening News] (Apr. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwbdfb/html/2010-04/22/content_807416.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2011).
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changing bed linen.229 In Nanping, in Fujian, more than 100 medical workers protested after a
violent clash between hospital staff and protestors following the death of a patient.230
Interviews confirm that violence is routine in medical disputes in Municipality A. In one
2010 case the husband of a deceased cancer patient threatened to kill the responsible doctor and
brought twenty people to protest. The protestors broke the hospital’s windows but were chased
away by hospital bodyguards who themselves called in friends with metal bars to repel the
protestors. The police, lacking sufficient resources to intervene, stood and watched. In the end
the hospital agreed to pay 15,000 to the family, despite the fact that the patient had come to the
hospital with late-term cancer.231 In another case a local village leader ordered each family
member in the village to send one male to protest against the hospital. And in a separate case
the head of a local hospital was beaten following the death of a child at a small hospital. A
county court judge in Municipality A estimated that there are ten to twenty major medical
protests a year in the county in which patients or their families cause significant disruption, block
access to a hospital, or place dead bodies inside hospital lobbies.232

河南洛阳乡干部非
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Shan Chungang, Henan Luoyang Xiang Ganbu Feifa Juliu 4 Ming Hushi Bei Tingzhi Juliu (
4
) [Village Cadres in Luoyang, Henan, Were Removed from Office and Detained for
Illegally Detaining 4 Nurses], XINHUA (Nov. 21, 2007), available at
http://news.163.com/07/1122/00/3TS6NC4N0001124J.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); Wang Shouzhen,
Zhongquan Chuji Da Yinao (
) [Heavy Fists Strike Hospital Protests],
http://www.qxzc.net/gr/wsz1/sb/5.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). Similarly, in Hunan, local medical staff protested
after they were allegedly beaten by protestors organized by local officials; the protestors were seeking compensation
after a family member of a local official allegedly died following an allergic reaction to a tetanus shot. Gongpu
Cheng Exing Yinao, Zhuzhou Shi Er Yiyuan Shijian Baodao (
,
) [Public
Servants Become Malicious Medical Protestors: Report on Incidents at Two Hospitals in Zhuzhou City],
http://www.xcar.com.cn/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=9886474 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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) [Nanping City No.1
Hospital’s Report on the Protest of Some Medical Workers Following the Jun. 21 Hospital-Patient Dispute],
available at http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1603956.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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A county health department official in Municipality A stated that when a patient dies in a
hospital family members are likely to protest: “if a living person goes in and a dead person
comes out then the family will protest.”233 The official estimated that as many as ninety-five
percent of cases in the county are settled through protest and negotiation, with hospitals often
paying compensation absent evidence of wrongdoing.234
Numerous provincial and municipal governments have issued rules designed to curb
medical protests. Such regulations provide insight into protest strategies and official
sensitivities.235 In Chengdu local regulations prohibit the use of banners and posters or creating
mourning shrines outside hospitals, forcibly taking medical records, forcibly removing bodies,
blocking the transfer of bodies from hospitals to funeral homes, or threatening or insulting
hospital staff.236 Chengdu authorities also announced that on-duty police would be stationed at
hospitals to prevent protests. In Shenzhen, regulations ban family members of patients from
assembling outside of hospitals.237 Heilongjiang regulations ban not only shrines and publicly
displaying or marching with the body of the deceased, but also kidnapping or detaining hospital
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Interview 2010-23.
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Interview 2010-23.
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Many such strategies resonate with tactics used in protests more generally in China. Xi Chen, The Power of
“Troublemaking”: Protest Tactics and Their Efficacy in China, COMPARATIVE POL., July 2009, at 451, 458-459.
Liu Chunmei, Exing Yinao Jian Cheng Zhuanmen Shichang, Qiangduo Shiti Deng Xingwei Weifa (恶性医闹渐
成专门市场, 抢夺尸体等行为违法) [Specialized Market Takes Shape for Violent Hospital Protests; Acts Such As
Snatching Corpse Are Illegal], Hua Xi Dushi Bao (华西都市报) [West China Municipal Daily] (Apr. 1, 2010),
available at http://society.nen.com.cn/society/353/3475353.shtml (last visited Nov. 1. 2011). The text of the
regulation is available at Chengdu Shi Guanyu Yifa Weihu Yiyuan Zhengchang Yiliao Zhixu De Tonggao (成都市
关于依法维护医院正常医疗秩序的通告) [Notice Regarding Maintaining Hospitals’ Orderly Medical Services
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According to Law] (promulgated by Chengdu Municipal Bureaus of Health and of Public Safety, Mar. 25, 2010,
effective Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.cmda.org.cn/news/content_x31988_c050201__.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011).
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西城法院请医学协会调解医疗纠纷
北京日报

Gao Jian, Xicheng Fayuan Qing Yixue Xiehui Tiaojie Yiliao Jiufen (
) [West
District Court Asks Medical Association to Mediate Medical Disputes], BEIJING RIBAO (
) (Beijing Daily)
(Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://news.163.com/09/1106/07/5NDUFJ43000120GR.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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staff.238 Regulations in Zhejiang encourage rapid resolution of disputes, requiring hospitals to
notify authorities of all disputes.239 In Shenyang, twenty-seven hospitals installed local public
security officers as deputy directors of the hospital to assist in managing disputes.240 In Hunan,
local Party officials are explicitly evaluated in part based on their ability to resolve medical
disputes; one report noted that the number of incidents declined from 857 in 2009 to 317 in 2010
as a result of the evaluation system.241 In 2012 the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public
Security issued a joint notice that reflected many similar concerns.242 Yet not all hospitals have
taken a hard line: a report on the Chengdu Military Hospital, in Sichuan, noted that in order to
238

Deng, supra note 197.

239

Zhejiang Sheng Yiliao Jiufen Yufang Yu Chuli Banfa, supra note 109. In Xuchang, Henan, regulations state that
the police shall take over the body of the deceased in major medical disputes. Xuchang Shi Renmin Zhengfu
Guanyu Yinfa Xuchang Shi Zhongda Yihuan Jiufen Yingji Chuzhi Yuan De Tongzhi (

许昌市人民政府关于印发许

昌市重大医患纠纷应急处置预案的通知) [Notice Regarding the Issuance of Emergency Response Plans for Major
Hospital-Patient Disputes in Xuchang City] (promulgated by Hunan Province Xuchang Municipal People’s
Government, Jun. 10, 2008), XU ZHEN (许政) [Xuchang Gov’t Pub.] No. 39 (2008), available at http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=264668 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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阳 家医院为防医闹聘警察当副院长引争议

南方日报

Prevent Hospital Protests, Drawing Controvery], NANFANG RIBAO (
) [Southern Daily] (Jul. 5, 2010),
available at http://china.nfdaily.cn/content/2010-07/05/content_13451799.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). Reports
from Henan similarly state that police stations are being established in hospitals, in order to “hit hard” against
protesters. Qiao Weihui et al., Zhengzhou Jingfang Qidong “Lijian” Xingdong, Yiyuan Baojieyuan Meizhun Jiu Shi
“
”
) [Zhengzhou Police Start “Sword”
Qianfu Minjing (

郑州警方启动 利剑 行动 医院保洁员没准就是潜伏民警
Action; Cleaner at Hospital Could Be Undercover Police], DAHE BAO (大河报) [Dahe Daily] (Jan. 19, 2011),
available at http://news.shangdu.com/101/20110119/7_186709.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).

Tang Jiangpeng, Hunan Shouci Jiang Chuzhi Yihuan Jiufen Naru Zongzhi Gongzuo Jixiao Kaohe (湖南首次将
处置医患纠纷纳入综治工作绩效考核) [Hunan Will For the First Time Factor Handling of Hospital-Patient
Disputes into Comprehensive Performance Review], CHANGWAN JITUAN GUNDONG XINWEN (长晚集团滚动新闻)
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[Changwan Group Rolling News] (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
http://roll.changsha.cn/1/201101/t20110121_1215593.htm.
242

（关于维护医疗

Ministry of Health & Ministry of Public Security, Guanyu Weihu Yiliao Jigou Chixu De Tonggao
[Notice Regarding Maintaining the Order of Medical Institutions], May 1, 2012, available at
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/zwgkzt/s9968/201205/54607.htm (last visited July 12, 2012).
The regulations restrict the movement of the bodies of deceased patients and ban activities such as burning of
paper money, creating memorials, or generally causing disturbances at hospitals.
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“diffuse the tense environment” the hospital installed flat screens with “sexy photos” of the
hospital’s nursing staff.243
A number of jurisdictions, including at least one county in Municipality A, have created
new mediation institutions under local health departments designed to resolve medical disputes
quickly and thus reduce conflict.244 The creation of these institutions reflects national efforts to
emphasize mediation as a tool for maintaining social stability. Official accounts have extolled
the creation of such institutions, but they appear to be of only limited effectiveness on the ground.
Few of the interviewees for this project mentioned resolving cases through specialized mediation
institutions.245 Instead, direct negotiation between the parties remains common.246

性感护士救医患关系 很傻很天真
中国新闻网

243

Xinggan Hushi Jiu Yihuan Guanxi? Hen Sha Hen Tianzhen (
?
) [Sexy Nurses
to Save Hospital-Patient Relationship? Very Stupid and Very Naïve], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG (
)
[China News Online] (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://women.sohu.com/20110119/n278948925.shtml (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011).

第三方调解让医闹安静地走
开) [Third-Party Mediation Quietly Drives Away Hospital Protests], FUJIAN RIBAO (福建日报) [Fujian Daily] (May
27, 2010), available at http://www.fj.xinhuanet.com/nmtsj/2010-05/27/content_19899305.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2011); Chuxian Yihuan Jiufen, Qu Yiyuan Zhengzhi De Shao (出现医患纠纷, 去医院争执的少) [Few Choose to
Protest at Hospitals in Hospital-Patient Disputes], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [Xinhua Online],
http://js.xhby.net/system/2010/05/11/010747857.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2011); Xu Yang, Tianjin Yinao Xianzhu
Jianshao, Shang Wan Yuan Jiufen Zhuanjia Ding Zeren (天津医闹显著减少, 上万元纠纷专家定责任) [Hospital
Protests in Tianjin Dramatically Decrease; Experts Decide Responsibility in Disputes Involving Ten Thousand Yuan
or More], RENMIN WANG (人民网) [People’s Daily Online], http://medicine.people.com.cn/GB/11521343.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011); Zhang Wei & Miao Xingxiang, Fujian Yihuan Jiufen Di San Fang Tiaojie Yinao Guanzhu
Le Ma (福建医患纠纷第三方调解医闹管住了吗) [Did Third-Party Mediation Resolve Hospital-Patient Disputes
and Control Hospital Protests in Fujian], SINA FUJIAN (新浪福建), http://fj.sina.com.cn/news/m/2010-07244

Cao Wenyi & Shen Haiseng, Di San Fang Tiaojie Rang Yinao Anjing De Zoukai (

24/090355125.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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In Yingtan, in Anhui, local authorities established a specialized mediation board in 2006 that combines officials
from the health bureau, police, justice bureau, courts, supervision, propaganda and letters and visits departments.
The committee maintains its own bank of medical experts whose goal appears to be to intervene in cases so as “to
explain medical facts” to aggrieved patients and their families. Yet the committee has also been used to send a
strong message that protestors will be dealt with harshly. One official report stated that the police had forcibly
removed 82 protestors from near hospitals; 42 were detained administratively and 12 were formally arrested. Of
those seven were eventually convicted of crimes. Perhaps not surprisingly, local hospitals reported that their payouts
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Tuoshan Huajie Yihuan Jiufen (
) [Yingtan City Party Officials Place
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Hospital and government officials and media accounts blame the rise in and escalation of
protests on the emergence in recent years of professional protestors.247 Such claims are difficult
to evaluate; many protestors are friends or neighbors of patients. Numerous reports detail efforts
to combat professional protestors.248 In Guangdong, police intervened to break up a protest by
seventy protestors seeking compensation after an eleven month old child died of brain cancer
while in the hospital and the child’s mother subsequently committed suicide by jumping out of a
hospital window.249 Local authorities alleged that most of the protestors had been hired by the
family to coerce compensation from the hospital.250 In Nanchang, in Jiangxi, protestors seeking
five million yuan in compensation blocked a local hospital for several hours and destroyed
hospital facilities; the protest only dissipated after the police interviewed and arrested protest
leaders. According to reporters, participants claimed to have come to protest because the
patient’s family has promised them compensation.251

阜阳平安网

WANG (
) [Fuyang Pingan Online], http://fypaw.org.cn/article/showinfo.asp?infoid=1124 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011). Critics of such efforts note that mediation entities are often tied to insurance companies and health
departments and are thus biased in favor of defendants. For example, in Zhejiang regulations bar public hospitals
from settling disputes for more than 10,000 yuan, apparently an effort to streamline the resolution of claims through
newly-established mediation entities. Zhejiang Sheng Yiliao Jiufen Yufang Yu Chuli Banfa, supra note 107. The
regulations also state that no settlements shall be paid for more than 10,000 yuan without first obtaining a medical
inspection decision—a clear effort to reduce pressure on hospitals to pay settlements.
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Interview 2010-16; Interview 2010-23.
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Liu, supra note 221; Gao, supra note 222. Judges also complain that some lawyers encourage their clients to
protest. Interview 2009-126.
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See, e.g., Qin Lei & Lin Xiaolei, Shehui Xiansan Renyuan “Yinao” Jianjue Daji (
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) (Dec. 27, 2010),
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Liao et al., supra note 203.

南昌 死者家属堵医院索 万

Nanchang: Sizhe Jiashu Du Yiyuan Suo 500 Wan (
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Deceased Patient Blocked Hospital Seeking 5 Million Yuan in Damages], DAJIANG WANG (
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Despite media accounts describing local police as working with hospitals to manage
protests,252 there is also evidence of police avoiding involvement, reflecting both concessive
policies toward protestors and a reluctance to assume responsibility. Hospital officials and their
lawyers complain that the police are often slow or unwilling to respond.253 Police avoid
involvement because they fear they will become the targets of the protestors if they intervene.
As one doctor said, “The Police don’t dare to touch [protestors].” 254 In Municipality A hospital
officials and lawyers describe local police as largely cooperative.255 Yet they complain of light
punishments, even for protestors who cause significant disruption or who block or physically
attack hospitals and staff.256
2.

Effects: Settlement and Flexibility

Protest works: faced with protests, “most hospitals just pay.”257 Hospital official say that
protests force them to pay compensation even in cases where they were not liable or to pay more
compensation than they believe was warranted.258 Hospitals are reluctant to share data on
settlements. Nevertheless, interviews with lawyers and hospital and government officials make
clear that hospitals settle the overwhelming majority of cases, generally more than ninety
percent.259 This is not surprising: most civil cases (in China and elsewhere) are resolved outside

警察进驻医院震慑医托医闹) [Police Stationed in
搜狐
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Li Guo et al., Jingcha Jinzhu Yiyuan Zhenshe Yituo Yinao (
Hospital Deter Medical Introducers and Medical Protestors], SOHU (
),
http://news.sohu.com/20070202/n247994130.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
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Interview 2009-116.

255

Interview 2010-24.
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Interview 2010-24; Interview 2010-23.
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Liu, supra note 221.
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Luo et al., supra note 100; Interview 2010-17.
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Interview 2009-116; Interview 2010-23; Interview 2009-101. Often both parties seek a rapid resolution of cases.
Lawyers and officials for hospitals say that in cases in which they uncover genuine errors they will seek a rapid
settlement. Interview 2010-6. Patients and their families often seek negotiated settlements to avoid an inspection by
the medical review board and because litigants are aware that they will receive less money if they pursue their
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the courts. What is unusual is the degree to which concerns about protests influence settlement
practice.
Settlements are often made with little regard to legal provisions and often exceed the
amounts that would be payable in court. Hospitals say they often settle when they believe they
face no risk of liability in court and agree to pay more than they would have to pay if the dispute
went to court. 260 Hospital officials describe themselves as playing a social insurance role in
medical cases, and note they are responsible for maintaining social stability. 261
The financial risk of litigation is a minor concern in most disputes. An official at a
county-level hospital in Municipality A stated that the economic impact of litigation remains
small even for a county hospital: hospitals pay on average one percent of revenue a year in
compensation, with a modest increase in recent years. The hospital, a major public hospital, paid
out 280,000 yuan in compensation for medical disputes in 2009, against income of
approximately 96 million yuan.262 Hospital officials in Shanghai likewise describe the total
payments made in medical cases as modest — with major cases reaching approximately 200,000
yuan.263 An official at a major Shanghai teaching hospital estimated that the hospital pays out
approximately five million yuan a year in compensation for medical disputes, against more than
a billion yuan in revenue.264 Hospital officials appear unconcerned that pushing more disputes

claims through court. Interview 2009-101; Interview 2010-3; Interview 2009-102; see also Interview 2009-116
(noting that parties are mainly concerned with money – not with the outcome of medical inspections).
260

Interview 2009-116.

261

Interview 2009-124; Interview 2009-103. Some hospital officials say they are also increasingly letting cases wind
up in court, because they do not want to make it too easy for plaintiffs to recover. Interview 2009-114. Others argue
that they are facing a rise in malicious cases—those brought by patients who fake injury in order to obtain
settlements from hospitals. Interview 2010-22
262

Interview 2010-22. The largest single judgment to date in the county was a judgment of 280,000 for a patient
who had become permanently disabled. The hospital official said that the judgment was not a major financial burden
for the defendant hospital, which has 480 beds, 150 doctors, and 130,000 outpatient visits a year. Id.
263

Interview 2009-101.
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Interview 2009-101. The financial risk of litigation is more significant for small hospitals or clinics, where a large
judgment could exceed the defendant’s ability to pay. In A, however, no clinics have been forced to close in
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into the formal legal system will encourage copycat lawsuits, likely because damage awards in
the courts are low.
Protests, in contrast, impose significant costs.265 Protests often disrupt hospitals’ ability
to operate. The reputational consequences for individual doctors and hospitals of an adverse
finding from a medical review board can be extremely damaging.266 Adverse outcomes may
affect the career development of doctors.267 For big hospitals protests can also affect their
relationships with their administrative supervisors;268 hospitals thus seek to avoid health bureaus
becoming aware of their problems.269 In rare cases medical disputes can result in the local health
bureau sanctioning or revoking the license of a hospital or doctor. 270 In general, however, health

response to adverse judgments or large settlements. This is largely because the clinics only see routine minor
illnesses, and are not allowed to provide care in high risk cases. Interview 2010-18; 2010-24..
265

Interview 2009-101; Interview 2010-17; Interview 2009-11; Interview 2009-7.
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Interview 2009-110. For discussion of how reputational sanctions may compensate for a weak legal regime in
other contexts in China, see Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s
Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV 929 (2008).
267

Interview 2009-116. Liability in medical disputes is virtually always put on the defendant hospital, not individual
doctors. Nevertheless hospitals generally require doctors to pay a share of any damage award. The system varies
from hospital to hospital, but generally medical staff will be asked to contribute a small percentage of any damage
award or settlement; in some cases the supervising doctor or department head will also be required to pay a share.
Interview 2009-103. In general the amount will be capped at 10,000 yuan, or about two months average salary for a
doctor. But individual departments within a hospital may also be asked to cover up to half of any compensation paid
to patients or their families. Interview 2010-17. In some cases individual departments within the hospital may settle
cases on their own, in order to minimize problems and to maintain their ability to claim they have had no complaints
in a given year. Interview 2010-17. Although it is rare for doctors to lose their licenses, errors may affect promotion
decisions or can lead to a demotion for doctors who are responsible for errors. Interview 2010-17; Interview 2009103.
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Interview 2010-5.
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Interview 2010-22; Interview 2010-22; Interview 2010-23. Nevertheless, in Municipality A the local health
bureau reported mediating 111 disputes in 2009. Interview 2010-16. Reflecting concerns about the risk of protest,
the health department official in Municipality A said that the health bureau will request that the patient’s family
bring no more than three people to the negotiations. In reality patients and their families will often bring more
people. Interview 2010-17.
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Interview 2010-5; Interview 2010-10.
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departments avoid becoming involved in cases because they are concerned they will themselves
become the targets of protestors.271
Although health departments may seek to avoid becoming directly involved in disputes,
many disputes become conflicts between protesters and the state. Hospitals sometimes welcome
intervention by local authorities because it shifts pressure onto the shoulders of local officials.
Yet intervention by Party officials often results in pressure on the hospital to settle272 and leads
hospitals to pay more than they believe they should.273 In one case in Municipality A, 100
protestors surrounded a hospital following the death of a local resident from head injuries
resulting from a fall. Family members argued that the hospital was responsible because an initial
CT scan had found no sign of bleeding in the brain. Faced with the large protest the hospital
entered into negotiations with the family — which took place over a week in a local hotel. Local
police and government officials also participated, with government officials pressuring the
hospital to settle for 50,000, despite the hospital’s view that it had not committed error.274
Likewise, in a case that arose in a county town in Municipality A, protestors made the hospital
“into a funeral zone.” In the end, the local party secretary ordered the hospital to compensate the
protestors.275 In some cases local governments provide funds to assist hospitals in settling
cases.276
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Interview 2010-8; Interview 2009-116.
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Interview 2010-17.
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Interview 2009-103.
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Interview 2010-17.
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Interview 2010-24.
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Interview 2010-17. Another case against a hospital in Municipality A arose as the result of patient dying from
cancer in 1999. The family did not initially complain and the local health bureau found no medical error. But the
family sued and the local court ordered 30,000 yuan in compensation as a result of numerous changes in the medical
records; on appeal the award was increased to 60,000. Following the appellate decision the wife of the decedent
began protesting to Beijing demanding more compensation. After more than ten years of petitioning local
authorities organized a “hearing” at her house where the case was discussed and local authorities attempted to
negotiate a settlement. The case was unresolved as of late 2010, but hospital officials predicted that local authorities
would step forward and pay significant compensation to the petitioner. Interview 2010-17.
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The threat of protest also shapes courts’ handling of malpractice lawsuits. Numerous
judges noted that in cases involving protests or the threat thereof they adjust outcomes to mollify
plaintiffs. Sometimes judges do this on their own; other times they do so in consultation with or
at the instruction of local Party-state officials.277 Judges say they sometimes order hospitals to
pay damages in cases in which there are no errors to appease protestors. 278 A judge in
Municipality A noted that cases potentially involving unrest are not resolved according to law;
law, reason, and sympathy are mixed together and cases are resolved by local officials rather
than by the courts.279 Another judge expressed frustration with the pressure courts face to
mollify protestors, arguing that in China today “police do not carry guns, and judges do not
decide cases.”280 Hospital officials also complain that courts make them compensate plaintiffs to
prevent escalation of protests.281 For example, a hospital official in Municipality A reported that
court officials told the hospital to accept a judicial inspection in one case because “the family
will not be happy” if the hospital insisted on an inspection by a medical review board. The
judicial inspection found that the hospital was ten percent liable for failure to discover the injury
on time. Yet the court refused to follow the recommended apportionment of liability. Instead,
the court assigned thirty percent of the blame to the hospital and ordered the hospital to pay
111,000 yuan in compensation.282
Judges justify their flexibility in medical disputes by noting that hospitals are generally
the strong party in malpractice cases.283 Courts must “maintain a harmonious society, especially
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Hospital officials likewise argue courts pressure them to agree to payments to patients in order to avoid unrest.
Interview 2010-22; Interview 2010-17.
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when [patients] bang at the door.”284 Judges say they will consider plaintiffs’ situations, and
admit that they may grant compensation to plaintiffs facing extremely difficult circumstances,
such as the loss of a child, even when the defendant committed no error. 285 Judges also note that
they avoid medical review board determinations by awarding emotional damages or
compensation for changes to medical records or for hospitals’ failure to provide adequate
information to patients.286
Judges describe themselves as caught between patients’ demands and legal requirements.
As one judge in Shanghai described the situation, courts have been told not to pay out in excess
of the amounts allowable under the Regulations. At the same time, however, they have been told
to resolve cases involving protests. As a result, courts “find ways to expand liability” against
hospitals. The goal in doing so, said the judge, is to increase compensation so that amounts
recoverable in medical cases do not vary from ordinary torts cases. Judges say they will
sometimes tell hospitals to pay plaintiffs more than is specified in a decision to ensure that the
case is resolved. Courts themselves may sometimes contribute funds to help resolve particularly
troublesome cases.287
The threat of protest also affects treatment decisions of doctors. Doctors report avoiding
difficult cases out of concern that adverse outcomes might result in protest.288 Doctors argue that
law is of little use when patients and their families resort to disruptive protests.289 Doctors allege
that many disputes involve people who simply died at the hospital, with no other basis for
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Id. Judges say that they sometimes will award emotional damages to compensate plaintiffs in cases in which
there was error but no causation between the error and the patient’s injury or death. Interview 2009-120.
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complaint.290 As a result, some doctors in Municipality A now avoid taking on certain complex
cases, instead sending the patients to the provincial capital for treatment.291
Despite the emphasis on settlement, hospital officials and judges report a steady increase
in the volume of cases winding up in court.292 This may reflect an increase in the total number of
medical disputes. The increase may, however, also reflect escalating patient demands and
greater legal consciousness among patients.293 Hospital officials say that in some cases they
prefer court judgments; a court decision may also make it easier for the hospital to assign blame
internally to doctors who have committed an error.294

V. IMPLICATIONS: AN OVER-RESPONSIVE STATE?
Evidence from court decisions and from the informal resolution of medical disputes
yields insights into trends in institutional evolution, dispute resolution, and governance in China.
In this section I discuss the implications for these three interrelated areas and for legal
development in China more generally.
1.

Institutional Evolution

Medical malpractice litigation appears to be in part a story of institutional failure. A
system designed to protect hospitals has encouraged patients and their families to engage in
disruptive behavior.295 Informal mechanisms have developed in significant part because the
290

Interview 2009-102; Interview 2009-116.
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Interview 2010-24.
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One judge in Shanghai estimated that his district court hears more than 100 medical disputes a year, with the
court granting awards to plaintiffs in the large majority of cases. Interview 2009-122.
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Interview 2010-17.
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The fact that hospital officials have resisted changing the current system when it would seem in their interest to
do so may suggest that the combination of defendant-friendly legal provisions and a system of ad hoc informal
dispute resolution and protest serves hospital interests. Although protests cause disruption, the current system
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formal system either cannot resolve patients’ claims or is not allowed to do so. The creation of
new institutions has had little stabilizing effect. Faced with formal institutions widely perceived
as unfair, patients and their families take matters into their own hands.
Medical disputes show how lack of trust in formal institutions -- in health care, in the
legal system, and in local authorities — is an important source of unrest. Medical disputes
combine widespread distrust of the healthcare and legal systems with often severe harm. Others
have engaged in empirical study of trust in China; those findings largely support the observations
in this paper regarding popular distrust of medical and legal institutions.296 As Elizabeth Perry
has noted, trust in the state — in particular the central Party-state — is common and widespread
in China.297 Trust in institutions and individual state actors, however, is weak. State response to
this distrust has been a combination of concessive and repressive policies: yielding to protestors
but also taking steps to ban certain acts and prevent escalation. Reform to institutional structures
has been slow.
The problem is not just that institutions are weak; it is that reforms to these institutions
have failed to keep up with popular expectations regarding both the courts and the healthcare
system. Medical disputes show that trust can cycle downward even as institutions improve.
Despite widespread problems in both the healthcare system and the courts, both have improved
markedly since the early years of the reform period.298 The decrease in institutional trust is the

imposes no significant financial cost on most defendants and allows hospitals to prevent external review of most
serious cases.
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For discussion of distrust in the context of medical disputes, see Xu & Lu, supra note 11, at 83, 90 (describing a
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product of continuing problems and increased expectations. In the courts, enhanced capacity and
competence have failed to yield greater public acceptance of court decisions.299
One lesson of medical disputes is that failure to permit the evolution of autonomous
institutions, be they courts, medical review boards, or the legal profession, may breed even more
instability.300 Lawmakers, courts, and academics have failed to create or even propose
institutions for evaluating medical error that balance patient rights with the need for experts to
assist in evaluating whether or not medical error has occurred. The problem is not just that the
decision on medical error is made by doctors answerable to the local health bureau; it is that
there is no way to conceptualize including patient voices in the process. Even if authorities
wanted to make the medical review boards fairer, for example by including patient advocates,
they would find it hard to find such people because of the restrictions that exist on the
development of NGOs and other autonomous institutions.
Yet focusing on the failure to develop autonomous institutions risks overlooking two
more subtle implications for institutional development in China. First, medical disputes suggest
that much of the institutional weakness, or flexibility in practice, is by design. The Chinese
Party-state appears committed to improving formal institutions at the same time that it continues
to be ambivalent about how much autonomy such institutions should be permitted to develop.
Party officials who intervene in medical disputes, like judges who adapt or ignore formal legal
rules because of stability concerns, are acting just as they are supposed to act. Arguments that
the formal legal system is being undermined by courts and officials who yield to protest miss the
fact that flexible interpretation (or ignoring) of formal legal rules has long been central to the
Chinese political-legal system. Courts that rigidly apply the law place themselves in a far more
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precarious position than those who take account of stability concerns. Courts that innovatively
adapt or ignore formal legal rules because of stability concerns are doing their jobs.
Similarly, the expanding role of professional protestors may reflect state ambiguity about
the role of formal institutions. Although widely criticized in the official media, such actors
serve important functions.301 The role of non-legal intermediaries is of course not unique to
China.302 Yet in China the expanding roles of such intermediaries may reflect the emergence of
new institutional arrangements in response to weaknesses in the formal legal system as well as
state concerns about permitting further development of legal institutions.303
Second, medical cases demonstrate that innovation in the Chinese legal system does not
equate to increased autonomy for legal institutions. Evidence from medical disputes reveals the
adaptive and innovative capabilities of China’s courts. Courts have adopted flexible
interpretations of existing regulations in order to appease plaintiffs and defendants and have
resisted legal standards many view as unfair. Yet such innovation is not aimed at increasing
court autonomy; instead, it is designed to insulate courts from direct protest and from being
blamed for allowing disputes to escalate.
These two observations add depth to existing understandings of the development
trajectory of courts in authoritarian systems and of institutional evolution in China. Most recent
literature on courts in authoritarian systems has focused on ways in which courts begin to
challenge existing institutional arrangements and political authority, in particular as courts
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develop new competence.304 Similarly, literature on China’s legal development has focused
overwhelmingly on formal legal institutions and processes and has generally assumed that the
end goal of legal reforms is to create robust legal institutions. Medical disputes in China show
that court innovation may be designed to insulate courts from external pressure and criticism, not
to expand court autonomy.
Analysis of medical disputes in China also contributes to literature on institutional
development in China. Prior scholarship has examined how “institutional conversion,” the use
of existing institutions for new purposes, plays out in China.305 Medical cases highlight ways in
which China’s courts are taking on new roles and how such roles may reinforce rather than
challenge state authority. Litigants are bringing a widening range of claims into the courts,
forcing courts to confront new issues. Courts are developing strategies to deal with these new
uses of the courts. Yet institutional conversion in the courts is not only coming from litigants; it
is also coming from the state’s use of the courts to help maintain stability by providing largely
low-value remedies to those with grievances. Courts are serving as strategic resources for both
litigants and for the state.306
Understanding the processes courts use — innovative legal reasoning combined with
attempts to place such decisions in line with Party-state concerns regarding stability — suggests
that courts are able to channel new claims in ways that provide litigants redress without
challenging the political status quo. Courts are able to use their growing competence selectively.
The coping strategies courts are employing are consistent with those recognized in existing
literature on endogenous institutional evolution in China.307 Over time, this increased capacity
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for innovation combined with a willingness to engage in subtle pushback may provide a base for
continued evolution in the roles courts play.
Evidence from medical disputes reinforces the observation that increased institutional
competence and sophistication will not necessarily lead to rapid change or political challenges.
Medical cases suggest that continued endogenous institutional evolution in the courts is possible
but that such evolution is most likely to come from courts continuing to expand their adaptive
capacities in routine disputes, not from cases that directly challenge political norms. Such a
process also carries risk: as Xi Chen has noted, the inability of institutions sufficiently to adapt
to popular uses may also give rise to unrest.308 In the courts the potential for instability stems not
only from the failure to adapt to new uses or to meet new demands. The use of the courts for
new purposes — by litigants to pursue a broader range of claims and by the state to ensure
stability -- is also in tension with avowed state goals of developing a rule-based system of
governance. A central insight from medical cases is that some litigants are able to use the legal
system to obtain compensation, but that what appear to be normatively desirable outcomes
(aggrieved individuals winning redress) are often achieved through flexible application of legal
rules.
2. Law in the Shadow of Protest
Despite three decades of emphasis on constructing a comprehensive legal framework,
medical cases show that in many disputes in China the “shadow of the law”309 is weak or nonexistent. In medical disputes law operates in the shadow of protest. The threat of protest keeps
many cases out of court and also casts a shadow over how courts handle cases that do wind up in
the formal legal system. Hospital officials, judges, and health department officials acknowledge
that whether or not they face a protest or threat thereof is generally the most important factor
influencing resolution of medical disputes. Most disputes are resolved with little, if any,
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reference to potential legal liability, evidenced by the fact that negotiated outcomes in medical
disputes frequently exceed the amounts awardable in court.
Much existing literature on China has assumed and argued that the primary goals of legal
reforms include the creation of rules that facilitate economic development and the state’s retreat
from micro-management of individuals’ lives.310 Conventional understandings of China’s legal
development have assumed that China is transitioning to a rule-based system, albeit one with
many weaknesses, with a gradual expansion of the binding power of law and formal legal
institutions. Recognizing the shadow that the threat of instability casts on legal proceedings
challenges many existing assumptions about the trajectories of China’s legal reforms. Medical
disputes show there remain significant limitations on the impact of legal rules on contentious
social issues even in areas in which the state has devoted resources to creating rules, institutions,
and procedures.
Scholars have long recognized that many disputes, in China and elsewhere, are resolved
primarily with reference to informal social norms, not formal law.311 Medical disputes highlight
two ways in which contemporary Chinese practice appears to be diverging from existing models.
First, in medical disputes in China law is of limited relevance in disputes even among armslength actors. Claims are not being resolved within closed communities or among repeat
players.312 Instead, disputes often escalate into moral claims against the state, in which law plays
little role in ordering outcomes.
Second, the most important determinant of outcome is the threat of unrest and violence.
Evidence from medical cases suggests that law-related protests are not merely serving as
pressure valves and that the risk of violence is not a minor external annoyance for China’s courts.
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Violence and protest are now key aspects of how the system functions, part the cycle of dispute
resolution. The risk of instability is a key determinant of the resolution of disputes both inside
and outside the courtroom. The process is dynamic and claimants often pursue multiple
strategies. The influence runs in only one direction, however: protest impacts law; law plays
little role influencing or limiting the resolution of protests.
Medical disputes are particularly likely to result in escalation and violence, reflecting
their high stakes and problems in the healthcare system. Yet the phenomenon is not unique to
medical disputes. Similar dynamics exist in other contentious social spheres, most notably land,
labor, and mass torts,313 where despite extensive attention to the construction of formal legal
standards much of the action in resolving disputes remains outside the courtroom. Literature on
China has, with few exceptions,314 focused on how courts function inside the courtroom. Doing
so, however, risks failing to see the important roles that protest and violence play in influencing
court outcomes.
Recognizing that law operates in the shadow of protest in China raises questions about
the commitment and capacity of the Chinese state to strengthen the legal system. The state
encourages (and at times compels315) settlement, often closing the courtroom doors to
contentious claims. Courts’ institutional weakness means that they find it difficult to resolve
high-profile cases, even where existing laws provide clear standards for adjudication. Within
China the frequency with which litigants either eschew litigation entirely or use protest as a
strategy alongside protest is often explained as resulting from lack of public confidence in the
courts and from a tradition in which litigation is rarely the default mechanism for resolving
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disputes. Medical cases highlight another factor: litigants accurately understand that the most
effective route to compensation is often outside the formal legal system.
It would be an overstatement to describe China as a society in which every legal issue is
transformed into a non-legal issue, the reverse of Toqueville’s famous observation about the
U.S.316 Yet the description of China would not be far off, at least with regard to significant
social issues or cases that pose a threat of even mild protest. There is a lot of ordinary law in
China, cases that are resolved routinely through the formal legal system. Popular practice and
discourse regarding law are shaping the evolution of how the legal system functions. But there is
also a strong tendency for a wide range of cases to be taken out of the system, or within the
courts to be resolved without reference to law on the books.317 Courts are limited in their
authority to impact formal law and actual practice on contentious or high profile issues.
In China, as in other countries, a range of factors shape the formation of legal norms and
of popular understanding of law. Writing about the United States, Michael Grossman noted that
law consists not only of formal law and court practices but also “social currents, political
developments, economic changes, and other forces in larger society.”318 China appears striking
for the limited impact of formal law and court practice in shaping public understandings of law.
Court cases may result in media coverage and shape official and popular practices and
understandings, but such impact rarely stems from court decisions. Many such cases are notable
for the fact that they are resolved without a formal court decision or with a decision dictated by
Party officials.319 Feedback on legal norms in China comes from negotiated outcomes and state
responses to protest and popular attention; feedback from court decisions is much less influential.
Recent high-profile cases in which court decisions are said to impact popular behavior and
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understanding of law have often been cases in which popular behavior has been shaped by courts’
misapplication of law.320 Legal institutions have become important spaces of contestation in
China, but they remain one of many such spaces and lack a privileged role in resolving disputes
or in shaping the resolution of disputes outside the courts.

3. Protest and Responsiveness: Nationalizing Private Litigation
Medical disputes show how claims that begin as private law disputes become claims
against the state. Rather than facilitating the development of legal institutions to resolve private
disputes, official responsiveness sends the message that a range of private law disputes are in fact
claims against the state. This is not an observation unique to medical disputes: similar dynamics
exist in other areas that also frequently give rise to unrest, including land and labor disputes.321
Hospitals are not purely private actors: most are state-owned and remain overseen by local
health bureaus. Nevertheless, official responsiveness to protest reinforces popular views that
hospitals are representatives of the state.
Medical disputes represent an increasingly common phenomenon in contemporary China:
the nationalization of private litigation. Many disputes on contentious issues are resolved outside
the legal system. Protest and petitioning can transform even routine claims by individuals into
direct negotiations with the state. The result may be “order without law,” but such disputes are
not resolved via private ordering.322 Resolution takes place through direct bargaining with the
state. Obsession with stability means that in a wide range of cases authorities rush to resolve
320
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cases before they reach court by paying off aggrieved individuals. Concerns about stability also
trump legal rules when cases do reach court.
Leading explanations of state responsiveness to protest in China focus on two central
factors: incentives facing local officials to prevent unrest and the ability of protestors to escalate
their demands.323 Medical cases suggest that incentives to maintain stability are only part of the
story. Grievances and resulting protests, in medical cases as in other spheres, are effective not
just because they threaten escalation or unrest, but also because they challenge the legitimacy
narrative that the Party-state has sought so hard to create.324 Implicit in claims against the state
are both threats of escalation and appeals to the state’s responsibility to care for those with
grievances. Despite three decades of legal reform, officials continue to view themselves as
universal ordering agents. Officials are responsive to claims that the state should care for those
who have suffered misfortune.
Medical disputes highlight the over- and under-responsiveness of the Chinese Party-state.
There is widespread shirking by state institutions. Hospital officials complain that they are left
to resolve disputes on their own because other state institutions, including the police and health
bureaus, refuse to get involved out of fear that they will become targets of protest. At the same
time, medical disputes show how state intervention can transform disputes between largely
private actors into the concern of local authorities and thus implicitly into disputes that test the
legitimacy of the state.
State over- and under-responsiveness reflects uncertainty about the role of the state and
the role of the legal system. Conventional arguments regarding why the Party-state remains
wary of allowing courts and the legal system to expand their authority focus on state concerns
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that even modest steps toward independent courts would pose a political risk to the Communist
Party. Official sensitivities regarding western-funded rule of law efforts have clearly been
heightened in the wake of revolutions in the Arab world and there are signs of increased state
distrust of the legal profession. Such concerns explain crackdowns on rights lawyers and
restrictions on courts’ abilities to hear constitutional claims and other major public law
disputes.325 Yet focusing on a hypothetical political threat from the development of stronger
courts is barely credible in a system in which court appointments are largely controlled by the
Party Organization Department and in which there is little history or evidence of courts
challenging political authority. Such concerns also cannot explain the tendency to transform
even routine cases into claims against the state.
A more likely explanation is that unease regarding the role of law and courts and
unwillingness to allow courts more autonomy to resolve private disputes reflects broader
uncertainly about the role of state. Litigants and officials continue to expect the state to play a
strong role in resolving a wide range of disputes; the idea of an all-powerful, or “quanneng” state
remains strong. Party-state officials appear unwilling to let go of this role, in particular in a time
of rapid change.
As Anthony Saich noted nearly a decade ago, the post-reform Chinese state lacks a clear
vision of its role. As a result the state engages in micro-management and flexible resolution of
problems, what Saich referred to as “the politics of muddling through.”326 Medical disputes
show how this flexibility interfaces with the legal system. Rather than stepping back and
allowing the legal system to resolve disputes, the Party-state continues to micro-manage
individual disputes and to encourage and at times require local officials to intervene. At the
same time, however, the Party-state continues to devote extensive resources to developing
China’s legal infrastructure.
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The cycle of protest, responsiveness, and ignoring of legal rules and procedures appears
unstable. The fact that protest works incentivizes others to do the same. Literature on protest in
China, however, offers another possible interpretation for the rise and tolerance of protest:
allowing such protest may have a stabilizing effect.327 Permitting protest may prevent escalation,
play a useful oversight function, and provide the regime with information. Evidence from
medical-related protests largely fit into this stability-enhancing model. Protests are mostly
atomized and protestors voice their complaints in terms of demands for redress in individual
cases, not regime challenges.328 Many such claims resonate with a tradition of claims for a
“fundamental right to subsidence.”329 A process that encourages claims to morph from protest
into settlement also dovetails with official distrust of the formal legal sphere.
Medical cases highlight another possible benefit to a system that rewards protest: doing
so may help to screen for those with the most serious grievances and may be cheaper than
providing a robust social welfare system. As Xi Chen and Peter Lorentzen have noted, the state
takes protest as evidence of the credibility of grievances.330 In a system in which the state is
unable or unwilling to provide the resources necessary to transform the healthcare system
radically, allowing protest may serve both to highlight problems in the system and to identify
those most aggrieved. Focusing on those with the strongest grievances helps not only to
maintain stability but also reduces costs, to hospitals and to the state. The same may be true for
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the legal system more generally, which may be ill-equipped to confront the full range and
quantity of claims resulting from China’s rapid social transformation and proliferation of new
laws.
Despite the potential for protest to reinforce stability, however, medical disputes also
reflect tensions at the heart of legal reforms. Protest may reinforce regime stability, but relying
on protest remains in tension with state efforts to improve the legal system. The Chinese system
continues to be one in which outcomes, not procedure, provide the primary external metric for
evaluation of the courts and other institutions. In the short term such an approach may enhance
stability by focusing on compensation for those with the strongest grievances. In the long term,
however, whether stability will be enhanced by state emphasis on responsiveness to grievances,
not the embrace of rules and procedures, is less clear. Recognizing the dynamic of overresponsiveness challenges not only the state’s avowed commitment to law, but also basic
understandings regarding the importance of rule-based governance to the sustainability of
China’s model of authoritarian governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The level of violence and unrest in medical disputes is in some respects unsurprising: the
combination of high stakes, a healthcare system widely perceived as focused on profit rather than
patient care, lack of a social safety net, and biased dispute resolution institutions might well
produce instability in any system. The trend toward resolution of claims through protest and
violence appears likely to become more widespread absent significant reforms.
Some recent reforms appear designed to reduce unrest. Efforts by the Supreme People’s
Court to streamline the handling of medical cases and reduce reliance on doctor-controlled
medical review boards may help to lessen tension and encourage litigants to pursue their claims
in court, as would allowing larger damage awards. Modest steps toward fairness can be taken by
making review board determination reviewable in court and through providing for non-local
review of medical cases. Proposed reforms to address inequality in the healthcare system can
likewise be understood as in part an attempt to begin to address the destabilizing effects of
China’s healthcare crisis. Such efforts may, over time, reduce conflict over medical cases; the
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transformation of Taiwan’s healthcare system over the past twenty years may provide a useful
example, albeit on a much smaller scale. Yet changes to the healthcare system will take time and
will come at enormous cost. The grim reality is that conflict appears likely to get worse absent
radical state action to address problems in the healthcare system.
The rise in medical disputes is a story of evolution of formal law in China and also the
limits to such evolution. Medical disputes show how the state has invested in formal law in an
effort to reduce conflict and how state concerns about instability are often in tension with
commitment to strengthening the legal system. In medical disputes, as in healthcare and law
more generally, the Party-state is both over and under responsive. Disputes are resolved not in
the shadow of the law, but through micro-management by the state in the shadow of protest.
Medical cases show how increased institutional competence does not necessarily lead to
challenges to the political status quo. The cycle of distrust, protest, and concession that
characterizes medical disputes in China reflects uncertainties about how the Chinese state is
ordered and how it manages and resolves conflict.
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